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INTRODUCTION

! ue;lIOUA ella SIt. .,,1919_ - Befon In....stlgatlag B. G.
OOll1ngwood's cODOeptlOl'1 of ..mat a phllo8opbJ' of h1stOlT should
be and what probleu 1. t should deal w1 tit. a geaeml surYe,. of

\be gl'OUDd. this area ot ph11oaopb1c lwestlga.tlon can cover ls

1n order.

suoh a Pftoe41aN 1s warraated. bMaue • •:rloan U1d

Brttlsh philosophers util the reoent "oars ot this oentlu7 haTe
shown a Wldespread nftglect O'l hlstoJl7' and the phll.080ph1c pro-

bl_ whlob 1t ental1s.
1'b18 1s 'l'Ue becausc llestem pb1.1osophers bave lnvesti-

gated a1'ld refleoted 11poa science

Qd

lts .ethods, tor the lIOn

part, sll1Pl1' because ...,. were lmpressed wltb the speotacmlar
progress Whlch sol.... has made over the last two o_tur1es.
Thus a pbl1oGo:"!hy of salence has developed. cons1sting of the

1nvestlgat1oD of proble.s which arts.
methods and assumptlOllS

or

tro~

retleot1on on the

solen•• and the nature and oondltlone

of sclentlt10 knowledge itself.
There has been a tendency pos! tl vely' to exolude h1story
as a branoh

ot knoWledge at all.

1'b.18 oaa be ,raoed back into

the seventeenth century to Descartes who, using hiB c:r1terion or
1

2

secure and certain knowledge, deolared that hlstol'1. "however

interesting tUld instructtve, however valuable towards the formatton of a practical attitude 1n lite. could not cla1m. truth.
tor the events which it desorlbed never happened exactly as it
dMcrlbed them. 01
This devotion to sctentifie thought and prooedures led
to an outspoken d.1strnst of &D3" type of reflection which oould
be termed ttmetaptqsloal l ' .

By this tem 1s meant an:! attempt to

deVise a unified interpretation of exper1w.oe or to expla1n all
things in

til

single all-embraoing system.

Phl1osOPh1 ot hlsto%7

as popularly known until rather reoent t1:;aes would ta.ll into
th1s eategory of metaphysical refleotlon.

For philosophy of

h1story was conceived a.s an attempt to discover the mea.n1ng and
purpose of the Whole histor1oal process.

Even the exam1nat1on ot the logic ot historioal thought
and the validity of lts credentials are lscues of comparatively

little 1nterest to

~.

ot the leading phllosophers of our dsy.

Nevertheless:
• • • it rema1ns surprtslng that philosophers pay more
attention to the lOgiC) ot such natl.1l'8.1 soiences as matheac.t1cs and l>h7s1os, which comparatively few of them know
well at tiNt band and neglect that of history and the other
humane studies. with whioh in the course ot tbe1r normal

1R. G. Collingwood, Isttfs

Press, 1946). p.

S9.

at lAHeu:

(axtoMs Clarendon

:3

education the,. tend to be more tam111ar. 2
Because of this tendency to ignore hlstor,r as a form ot
knowledge worthy' of ph11osophle reflection, 1 t would be worth-

while to present a general BUn'ey ot what a pbllosophy ot history' ls and what p:roblems it lnvestlgates, before we present
B. G" Col11l'lo"'"Wood • e ph!.loSQphy or hi story •
em

••

_nM

~

....

_.,

.

.. ,

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY INV'&STIGATED

:hI mt!D&11S it tie w0f!!.

"bi,t2a:". 'rhe word

used to designate two qU1te difterent th1ngs.

"h1stol'1" can be

It can reter to

the totallty ot past human actlons, all that man p:r1or to our

time bas been lnYOlved In.

It can also be uaed to refer to the

wr1tten account of these past hUman aotlons 'Mhleh the historian
oonstructs.

Therefore what a ph1losopbJ' ot blst-or.y ls depends

on the mean1..ng we g1va tbe word, "h1st017".

A philosoph,. of

hlstor.y 1n tbe tlrst sense would be a consideratlon of the course

hlstor.loal events have taken nth a new to d1scoverlng the
meaning and purpose

ot

the 1Ibole hlstor1cal process.

A philoso-

phy of h1stor.y 1n the second sense would be one which examines
the process of historical th1nk1ng a!J4 the means bf Wh1ch the

acoount of historlcal. actloM 1s constructed.

It 1s p:r1man11

lnterested. 1n the hlstori.an as he proceeds to lnvestlgate an histoneal .vent. not 1n the partloular hlstor1ca.l event ltself.

SPI9BlJi!:!ia,., Rh&12s ePhl 0;:

h1ueu.

Ph11osoph7 ot history, With

"h1st017" taken 1n the tlrst sense defined above t 1s deSignated
a "speoulatlve

ph1loso~

ot hlat-017"..

'rhe following oould serve

as a tol.'maJ. detlld. tlon ot this type of ph11osophJ ot history',
4

,
A pbl,lo_JJb7 of hlato17 's . . lltterpretatloD ot Msw%7

which ~"8 W deftft h,toa a OODSldemt101l or .a'.
paat a slagle oonoeptOJl' PI1.M1pl. Wh10h l1'lltae1.t 18 nt-

tlclent to expla1n tbe ult1ate UNotion or hlstonoa1
ObaDge at tne7/!7 point 1ft the h1atoJ1.oal P!'OMd. !has
tImJ phl1080phJ ot hlstO-17 CODa18ta In the to~t1011 or
a 1a' or b1_1»or.loal eb.aa«. al_ expW- the 41rec'tlon or
flow of ~e evfmh.'
We Wll1 take as ___pl_ 01: tMe t7Pe of ph11oaophldftg
Karl MAn a.ad

are atrtetlF

l~ ~t

tOJ!

bepl_ 1n 111124 tbat our SUlllar1ea

the P\U"POtle ot tlla'ration aDd that a capre-

hensl," trea___ of thfllr work is

DO' lntended.

Karl Raft got the two _810 doetftaeB of hla tfteo1'1 ot

hlstol'7 hw Hegel.

Fire".

he

t.1' ....t tile taou or h18tOI7

ma.ntt.t d1aleotleal pat,ems of ftaU'J' nQ7"Wbe" and.

~.

the 41tteftftt a.spects ot a a.letT'. 11te ("11'1081, social,
~o) &1"'8 o~..ll,.

ftlaMd. 14th the

~c

aspect of

Ute poMbat1Dg all .theft.

a_

8.N ~

two dootftDU related. 111 the Marx1an tn.orr

or hlsto17? .Harx 0CJI'Jta4e4 that ln o1"4u to .-ke a -t1af'aotoJ!7
emal7ala of artI elgJd.f1.oaat a1taaau.. 1a ttl. aocd.a1 11t.

or . .

at aar . . perl04 of bl8'M17, 'Nt. . . . .at be .... "' tile

eco. . .o ecm41tloaa fit . .t pal04, . . . . . . . .
the GoadlU. .

.r

the pel04 aft

1fba' 'the7 aJ'e,

oa1 dM140paent !lI'IlIJt be 008814e1'e4.
Wit.

It

1
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6

class stracture of a soo1ety must be seen as 1t is evolved in

response to a need to solve certa1n production problems whioh
are caused by' the means of pl"Oductlon available to the soc1et7.
We must further obsel"V'e how developments 1n the

DlGanS

of produc-

tion put the ex1stlng eoonom1c organ1zat1on out of date and g1 ve
rise to the need tor soc1al ohange at the

V8'1:7

foundations of

soclety.4
flJarx, by' developing his phl1osol>h7 of history 1n this
maxmer. makes generalizations about the Whole course ot 111$to%7He says, tor example, that past hlstor1oa.l development shows tbat

eoonom1c tactors lIIlSt be a pa:rt ot atI7 historical s1 tuatloft, or
that the d1alect.loal process mtt.n1test in h1stOI7 shows tmat his-

tol'7 1s tending to the creation of a olassless c01$l1U11st society_
Another speoulatln phllosopher of h18to17 was Imm.anu.el

Kant.

His empir1cal exami:natlon of the world 1n41oated that the

world was chaotic!
One cannot avoid a oerta1n reel1ag of d.1sgust, when one
obsew" the aetloM of lIotUl d.1splaJed. on the great stage of
the world. Wlsdoa 1s maD1tested b7 lnd1V1 dual 8 bere and
there, bu,t the web ot hUlJl6\D. b18to17 as a lIbole appears to
lie lfOTen trom to117 and. cb.11d1sh 'VaD1t1. often, too, trom
puerlle Wiokedness and love of deBtnctioDs Wltb tl:1e result
that at the end one 18 puzzled to k:nO'II' what idea to form of
our ape.les wb10h prtdea itsaU so Bob on its advantages.5
However, Kant would not ao.cept thls conclusion as tiDal.

Ie

4w. Ji. Walsh,
Brothers, 1961), p.

ffi1912P1'\t 2&: 1l1no!Z (Hew York: Harper
•

eop.e'm Isa

51_DUel. I'.Imt.
17-18. as quoted by Walsh, p.

•

(Berlin ed1tlon), VIII.

7
Slnoe (as he proved. elsewhere ln h1s work) we must lead a moral

11te, SOlae sort at intel11gible plan, S1m1lar to Divine Provi-

dence, must be present.

Therefore 1t becomes the task ot the

ph1losopher to show that, desPlte the emp1ncal taots, history
1s a rat10nal prooess both prooeeding on an lntelllgible plan
and tend1l2g to a goal wh10h mo1'&l reason can approve.

This demand tor rationality outs1de ot the emplneal tact
leads !'ant to a theorr of progress 1n histor,y which explalDS how

man as a speoles must be progressing to hls goal despite appearances to the oontarr.
teleological..

!he v1 ewpolnt whlob he adopts Is markedl7

Man Is emplr1O&.l17 "bserved to have Implanted 1n

him a Y&st numberot tendencles. dispositions, or potentlal1tles.
Because 1 t would violate the lIastc pr1nc1ple that nature does
nothing 1n valn, we must hold. It llnl"e&SOl'lable to suppose that the
potcmtlal1tles of man sh.ould exist bu.t never be developed.

Ot

oourse we reoogl'l1ze that some at man's potentlal1t1es, especlall1

those connected w1 th reason, will not reach tull developtl8l'lt 1n

the Utetlme ot aD1' one 11'Jd1v1dual.

Theretore we must Imagine

that nature provides tor the development ot these potentialities
over a long period ot t1me so that they realize themselves so
~

tar as the specie. 1s ooncerned.. even though they m&1' not 1n the
ca.se ot all of the lnd1v1dual members. 6
USing tbe examples of Marx and Kant which we have sum-

8

mar1zed above, let us

make

a tew obsenations about the speou]..a....

tlve ph1losophy 01' hlstor.y whiCh these men represent.
The questtons raised by thls type

abOUt the whole course ot history.

ot ph1losophy are

The emp1r1oal taots, the

expl....tlon of one or other h1storloa1 JBOvement, such as the u1n

cause ot the ClVil War. or the developraent of labor unions 1n the

Um ted

Sta.tes t are only staning points.

This desire to draw

ge11.eal1zatlons t:rom the lnd1V1du.al taots ls usuallY' marked. by

a lack or _p1neal reaearoh.

'rtm.s lCaa'b would delq' the eono111-

ston to whlch the h1storloal 8'91denoe led h1la because the prln...
e1ple of lIIloral d.-nd draa tJIOa his ph11osopbJ' intervened.

The

blatorlan would say tbat it on.-s pb11osophy 18 DOt verlfled by
the facts, the his prlMlple. are

WZ'ODg.

Stmilarly JIIarx's

contention that an econo1lll1c motlYe is alW&7s present 1n every
hlstorloal situatlon, 1s not lID1veJ'8&1l.7 ...eafled by work1ng

historians.
People such as Begel, who see aU rea.Ut1 as :rational
and thus who i_lude hlsto1'7 under one rat10Dal plan, or 11ke
Kant t who se. rat10Ml.l t7 111 history as a deaa.nd because of the

eth1cal teneta of his pb1losopbJ't 1ndeed.. the vast maJor! t7 or
speculat1ve pb1losoph.!'S, come un.cler the distrust ot h1storians.

The reason 1s slapl..

An:f general co1lO1uslou drawn aboUt the

course of h1stor.r as a whole IIlUSt OOIle hom an exam1natlon ot

established h1atorloal. taota.

The task ph11oaophers of this

type un4ertake i.s humanly iapossi.bl.e.

Historians tbaselves 1n

9
the oourse ot a lifetime master one small period of hlstory such
as the economio l1te of the Napoleonic era or the mllltal"1 histo'lT

ot the Clvil War.

On the other hand. in principle. the

speculative ph1losopher claims a maste17 of the major port1on ot
all past hlstol'1.

How othe1"W1se could his vast generalizations

be verified?

Speoulative

pblloso~

indulges in pred1ctlon.

It

claims that it can discover Ull1versal laws ot h1story trom em-

pIrIcal. facts to cover all hlstorlcal events. past and f'u.ture.

There are objections to this procedure.

'!'he speculatlva ph1los-

opher by 1nsisting on draw1Dg untversal laws ot h1story seems
to be cla1m1ng the

S&l\le

type ot verltlabl11 t7 and cart1 tude as

scientifio knowledge whereas most historians would insist that
historical knowledge makes suoh an assertion 1mposslble.

His.

torically speak1ng t prediction ot t'U.ture events has been a r1sky

rather than seoure pastime.
Cr1:t&W

~12soPbl

o( Bi§H17-

Thus tar we bave seen what type

ot ph11osoph7 of' hlstory deTelops 1d1en we understand "history"
to refer to the total1 t7 of' past human act10ns.

Now it remains

to exam1ne the philosophy of history result1ng from. the understand.1ng of the word "h1ato17" to mean the w:r1 tten record ot'
these past human

ac~lons.

This type ot' philosophy we shall de-

Signate as a "oritical philosophy

ot' h1story."

The concern ot the critlcal ph1losopher, of course, is
not just the wr1 tten reeord of h1stol"1 in 1 tselt. tor thls would

10
hardl:r d1stlngu1sh h1m from the histOrian.

Rather It 1s a criti-

oal reflaot1on upon the whole procedure of the h1storian who

produces the wr1 tten record.
tl~~~sh

r"'urthermore 1 t attempts to d1s-

his procedures from other fields ot actlv1ty, especially

scientific enquiry.

We can, thall, formally define a critical

philosophy ot history' as eta critical enqu1ry Into the oharaoter
of historical th1nk1ng t a.n ana.lySls ot some ot the prooedures of
the historian and a compar1son of them.

~r1 th

those followed In

other d1sclpllnes, the natural. sciences in partleular. n 7 In
this sense. philosophy ot hlstor,y 1s considered under that branch
of philosophy known as theory ot knowledge or epistemology.
\-1. can diVide the results

ot this type ot investlgat10n

into tour me.1n problem areas t keeping In mlnd that tbe questions
treated under one area frequentl1 can be ralsed elsewhere.

The

problems are verJ olosely related and. our div1siQn 1s merely
arbl tra17, for the purpose of exposl tion. 8
The first aftd moat 1l1fluentlal group of modern pl111osophers to d.eny history 1 ts own place in lmO'tfledge are the positiVists who say that h1story can be reduced to sOient1f1c

l~w

ledge.
Objeotors would

ag~

that hlstory is scientific lmow-

ledge 1n the sense of a study With its own recognized methods
?~.t p. 119.

8The general division of problems used here 1s that used

by Walsh, pp. 16-24~

11
~'m1eh

must be mastered l::fy anyone td.shi:ng to be a good hlstor1an ..

But they contend that you cannot redu.ce it to the prooedures
and methods uae(l in sclenee ltself.
T'ae best ws.y of

prooeed1~

here 1 s by 't"lay of exam.t)le ..

Let us take the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

1,.fould

the

ent1re 1mpact and slgnificanoe ot this event be grasped lf we
reduoed 1t to a mtter of balliatics and the simple biologioal
transition of a. man tram J.lfe to death?

This event has e. quality

\'rith ,:hloh the historian is conoerned. whioh 1s tln1que and lrre-

ducible to general la.ws or atomio occurrenoes.

The

h1ator1~.

1s further conoerned w1 th this eTent in terms of 1 ts peo'll.llar

anteoe<iellts and oonsequenoes 1n order to help expla1n the event
1tsolf or trace 1ts impact on other historical events.

These

are qu.9.l1tles with lm,loh the approaoh of soientific knowledge
1s not oonoerned.

The hlstor1an dOeS not deny that the three

shots flred tlew in accord with the laws ot ballistics, and that
the lIfe

ot

John Kennedy ebbed. in "rays that doctors and biolo-

g1sts could predict.

All he claims 1s that the histortantJ oo:a-

eern goes far beyond th1s.
Furth.ermore, the positIv1stlc thInker says that historians connect historical events by see1ng them as examples of
gene:m.l laws"

14

fi,c1¢Q, b1 atorlans themselves shrlnk trom such

a conclusion and find the1r sign1fIcanoe as hlstona.ns in the

eXamina.t1on of partIcular events t not for the purpose of obta1ning genaml laws of hIstory, 'bUt rather for the explanatIon

12

ot the part1cula.r event 1 tselt •

An historian 1s interested, tor

example, 1n the Frenoh Revolution of 1789 or the English Revolution o'f 1688

0'1"

the Russian RevolutiO'n of 1911.

He 1s not

prlma.r1l;r ooncerned w1 th the general laws or rules at work in
revolut1ons as such.

Thus the average history book 1noludes

only the period under review and dlreotly :related matter.

It

the historian's interest and. that ot the scientist were the same.

the book woul.d 1nolude another ohaptel" which would

be

the most

important of the book, drawlng ou't the general laws govem1:ng
the partioular event 1n questlon. 9

The posit1v1sts are not the only ones to deny' hlstory
autonomy' as knowledge.
who sa.y

There are also some schools of reallsts

that h1story does not d1rter from common sense or per-

ceptual knowledge.

'lhey would set up the fol.lowlng relation:

perception 1s to the knowledge of ind1vldual facts a.bout the
present as h1story 1s to lnd1v1dual faots about the past.
Those who obJect to this e11m.1nat1on

ot the autonomy

of histor1oal knowledge would po1nt out that h1sto!'1. it redu.ced

to perceptual knOwledge. would be 11111ted to telllcg us
happened 1n the past.

!Jl!.t

The fact 1s however, that Mstorians are

not satisf1ed w1 th a mere narratlve of 'I1llrelated tacts but want
the thread of unlty wh1ch runs through them.

H1storlans a.sk not

only what happened but also why' it happened.

Reduct10n of bls-

~.t p. 39.

13
tory to mere perceptual knowledge ellm1nates this second quest1on.
It is the quest10n "Why?" that:

" " " makes inte1l1g1ble that celebrated 1dent1ty in <litterenoe (Whlch man;r ot the Idealist philosophers exaggerat&d a.nd. abused.) 1n vlrtue ot which we oonceive of one and
the same outlook as being expressed in very d1verse manifestat1ons, p<tl'Oe1ve atf'1n1tles (that are otten d.itfioult
and at times tmposs1ble to formulate) between the dress
of a soc1ety and its momls. 1ts systems ot 3ustice and.
the chamoter ofi ts poetry, its arch! teeture and its domestic habits, its solenoes and its n11g1ous symbols. 10
Furthermore what 1s perceived 1n hlsto1.7 1s not 1me facts
of the past.

The 1aed1aoy poss1 ble in perceptual knowledge is

gone torever as far as past facts go.

All we can have immedi-

ate knowledge of 1s the evidence which allows us to conclude to
past facts.

fl'b1s diff1culty 1s ve:ry 0108817' related to another

problem area which we now take up.
The seoond main problem area 1s concerned with trtlth
e.nd faot in history..

What truth means to one person depends on

what theory' of ltnOWledge he hold.s.

:aut t in e:tr1 case. truth and

fact have special ramiflcat10ns 1n relation to h1stor:y.

Ord1nanl,. we could denne a. taot as something supposed.
to have occurred. and open to direct inspeetlon 1n order to be
veri ti ed.

The problem is that h1stonoal taots are past tacts

and thus are no lODger open to d1reot inspection.

Statements

cannot be verl.tled with an 1nd..pendently knOwn reality.

B1s-

torloa.l facts must be established by means of evidenoe"

Ev1denoe

l0Pm&n, Histo!'3'

and Tbeory t p ..

28.

14
cons1sts of

doeu..~ents.

bU11d1ngs, monuments, 6'JeW1 tl'leSS a.ccounts.

etc. , lmloh are pertinent to the veriflcation of one or other

histor1ea1 statement.

This does not end the problem of histOri-

cal truth since even the presence of evidence does not guarantee
For the hlstor1an must dooide whether this eyel'11 tness to

truth.

the eJ:'*'\.'tptlon of Vesuvius has told the tnlth in this dooument.
or whether this set ot potter"J Will be ru1m1 tted as evidence or

not.

Thus the tluest10n of truth in h1story 1s reopened.

seems that 111

80U

sense the sUbJeotive faotor. the

It

jUl\~ent

of the historian himself t cannot a.ltogether be elim1nated from
hlsto:t7_
This lee.ds into our third problem area. the problem of

historical objeetlvi ty.
ob3ectiv1ty.

All historians acknowledge the need tor

This 1s seem in that all reputable histOrians eon-

demn propaga,nda and rel1anee on the historian t s perso:ne.J. feelings
and preoonceptlons.
or can. histor.y be?

But the question remains:
H01'f

HOll

objeotive 1s

can we, despite the condem.na.tlon of bias

and propa.g;a.nda. aocount tor the tl1tterence·s 1n reporting among

historians?

For evem though histOrians are conoe:rned 't'd.th an

1ndependent object (past h1storical events), they- have oome u.p
t11 th no common oanons of

lnt~rpretatl()n.

Therefore we eannot

deny that subjectiVitY' enters into histol'1eal ~mtlne.

The

quest10n is: To what extent?
This problem 1s approached gS.%1ger11 by' ma.rJ7.

First of

all, 1t 1s tbe problem Wh1ch has led so ma.ny to leave history on
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the level ot perceptual knowledge and refuse it the status of a
soience in the sense of a. field of study, With its own reoognized m.ethods.

It is a problem wh1ch has led so many to hlstor... ,

leal scepticism, whether

~1ey

llked the label or not.

Some would say that the subjeotive element in h1stor.y
makes impartial and obJeotlve history tmposalble.
imprint is too strong.

The personal

'!'he indiv1dual historian has too muoh

power in terms of the adm1ttanoe or rejection ot evidenoe aocording to his own persoMl Viewpoint.

Others would say that past failures of histOrians to

agree on common principles of judgment regard.1ng their work Bays
noth1ng about the tuture.

The development of a oommon h1stor1eal

oonsoiousness is much like the development of a personal1 ty.
takes t1me.

It

Perhaps this development oould be based on an ob-

jective study ot human nature.

Agreement on what man is and how

he functions could form a basis ot agreement on the prinolples
which govern the historian's judgment in his work.

Last17, many would oontend that no matter what one's
view, to a.sk an h1stonan to be detached trom his work as a sc1entist, is ask1ng the impossible.

All histOrians condemn biased

and tendentious work, but the historian's point of view camlot

be e11minated altogether.

His po1nt of View 1s one of the uni-

fying fMtors in what he 1s doing and helps him to select his

material tram infinite pieces of potent1al evidence.
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The last general problem area 1nvolves that of h1storical
explanation.

The main conflict here oomes down to the d1fference

between h1stor1cal and. solentifi0 explanation.

Put 1n the form

of a quest10n we ask: To what extent does h.1sto17 rely on generalizations?
Scient1fic explanation oonsists 1n the resolution of partloular events into oases of general. laws W1 th the understandJ..ng
that this process involves no more than an external View of the
phenomena under consideratlon.

The resulting understand1ng is

"abstraot" t in the seMe Of not be1ng ooncerned 1I1th the particular! t7 of the events stud1ed.

H1storioal explanation never

lea.Tes the partloular1ty of the events 1t stud1es.
main conoern.

Th1s 1s 1ts

f11sto17 relates one event to another 1n order to

View them as part ot a Whole concrete prooess.

1181;017 aska the

question QWIlT?". and thus attempts to go befond the mere phenomena.

Tbu.s the Wall Street crash is not viewed ot 1 tself but

related to events preceding and folloWing it in order to see
1t happened.

why

J:tlstoJ"1"" use generaUzations as presupposi tlOllS

(e.g. human _ture)

t

bUt 1ts as.m 1s not to formulate a s7st_

of general laws.
Thi S oompletes our 1!IUrV'eY' of the meaning and problems of
or1tioaJ. and speculative philosophies of histor.y.

Now we must

situate the subject ot this paper, R. G. Collingwood. tirst,
in relation to the philosophY' of' h1sto17 in general and secondJ.y.
in relation to the partloular type of philosophy ot hlstory

17
he pract1ced.

in !bJ.Ob

CRUlpg!oQSI

OME?

Robin George Collingwood is more

otten known and acknowledged tor his work in history and related
fields tharJ for his work in philosophy'.

Atter graduation trom

Oxf'oN where he won gold medals in both lI1story and class1cs t
he did doctoral work tirst 1n hlstory and later 1n archaeology.
For almost thirty years pl1.or to h1s death 1n 1943. be was the
recogn1zed author1ty on Boman Britain.
an histone.

work was

However, he was lUore than

In teNs ot pr1nted volumes, Me most prolific

dOM

1n philosophy.

His philosophical works include

Rel's;J;oD N¥I PhilosophY (1916), SEt9»l1ll fttllta s (1924), ifsaz oD

Hl1.os2Rb19!l: 191ih Qd
12:%. (19)6),

(1933) .. i6ea"~'"

AU~9Q.'!:I?b.l

1a1GB!

(19)4), 14e

ot HIs-

(1939), bill' on 111i@;;&11108 (1940),

and the

It!

I..eJ'J:atc!¥m (1942).

histol'Y

~

ph1losopbJ. 1 t 1s not surpl"1s1ng that he a."1o'ill.ct

Since he was profic1ent 1n both

have b$en conoerned W1 th a philosophy' ot history.
Collingwood. was deeply concerned about the negleot of
history by' English Philosophers.

Be inveighed constantly agalnst

neglecting hlsto%"1 and. told hls Oxford Oolleagues on !'tore than
one oocasion that "the obiet wslness of twentieth oentul7' phil-

osophy 1s to reckon with twent1eth oentl.U7 bistory. "11 He 1nslsted that histor.1 was a s1gnificant branch of knowledge, and

that one could not 40 ph11osophr as it h1story did not ex1 st.
11R. G. Collingwood. ~ A;!It;ol?logmP!Vt (London a Oxford
University Press, 1939),'p.
•
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ttl find myself constantly haunted by the

thoU[:~t

that their

(English phllosophers t) aocounts of knowledge • • • not only
ignore historical thinking but a.re a.ctually inconsistent w1 th
there being s·l1oh a thing. tf 12
Several historical events helped to oonvince Collingwood

ot the value of philosophical reflection on hlstory.

IrheFlrst

Horld. War and. the treatY' which ended it struck h1m With the "con-

trast between the suceess of modem European minds in cont:rol11ng
almost any situat10n in which the elements are physical bodies

and the forces ph1s1caJ. forces, and the1r lr.abl11ty to control
81 tuatlons in which the elements are human beings and the forces

mental forces."13

He felt that m.od.ern Europeans, 1t they were

to understand human action With a purpose, must do so b.Y us1ng
the methods

done and

aN

ot

h1stcr.y.

Thus by under'Stand1ng wha.t others have

doing, they could master the 81 tuatlons in which

they found themselves:
Well-meaning babblers talked about the necessity tor a
change ot heart. But the trouble was obviously in the head.
What was needed was not more goodwlll and human affeotlon,
but more understand1ng 9~ htl1aan attalrs and more knowledge
of how to handle them. 14
BGgs.rd.ir~

specifio types of ph11osophy ot history', Col-

lingwood rejected the poss! b1ll ty of there be1ng sueh a thing as
J •

12souroe ot this quote not g1ven.

Used b.1 Bans Meyerhott,

book rev1ew of ::bpft~l1' Hj.§tm b1 Patriok Gardiner, JD.si9JX

and

Xlleon. Vol.·

o.

.

1JColl1ngwood, An &U0!>12SraW, p. 90.

1
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a. speculati va ph1losoph,. ot history'.

This is true because the

vast majority of facts from wh1ch generalizations are drawn about
the universal plan of history' are
substantiated.

aJ.~s

in the process ot being

History 1s never a fin1shed product.

What is a

fact today. w1 th the UllCoverlngof more evidence. may not be a
faot tomorrow.

So how can a un1 versal plan drawn from changing

faot$ be valid?
Thus the object of actual historical thlnk1ng is an
object which is not "g1ven'· but perpetually 1n process ot
be1Dg glVen. To phi1osophize about h1storr as if this object. as it a.ppears at this or that mom.ent. were the reality
tor wh10h the histOrian is look1ng, 1s to begin at the wrong
end. If there 1s to be So philosophy of history, 1 t can
onl.y be a philosophical. retlenon. on the h1storla.n· s ettort
to attain truth. not on Q truth. wh1ch has not 1'et been

atta1ned.1S

Collingwood further rejects the attempt to discover the
plan of D1 nne ProVidence 'tor the world from history.
this would be theological dete1'm1n1sm.

For him,

tiThe plan wh1ch 1s re-

vealed. 1n h1story 1s a plan wbich does not pre-exist to 1ts
own revelat101u histo17 1s a drama, but an extemporized d.:rama.

co-operatively extemporized
Any'

b.1 lts

own performers. u16

attempt to discover the plot of history ls the job

of the historian not the philosopher.

The size ot the under-

taking, even if it were to be an attempt to disoover the plot

of' all hlsto17 thus tar lm.otm., ls no criterion for distlngu1sh-

l'sn. G. Colll1'lgWood, "The Natu.re and Alms of a Ph11oso-

phy ot Histor:t," A;:1stotellY Soo1§l
vol. 25, p. 161.
16;&b3ad •• p. 153.

fWsu~4!,ass

(1924-2,S),
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lng the ph1losopher from the h1stor1an.

It 1t 1s the h1storian's

task to discover the detalls, it is hls worl!: to disoover the 1nterconnexion of the details.

The historian tells us the plot

of the Norman Conquest. the French Revolution, and. 1f it were
poss1ble, the plot of all history that 1s or oan be known to us.
The key' idea here is to rea11ze that hiStory and the plot or

hiStory are not two things but one and thus to mow history or
the plot of h1stOr.1 1s the work not of two different kinds of
men but one.

It 1s clear then. that Collingwood re3eots the

possibilitY' ot a speoulative ph11osophy of hlstory.1?

In his book. ,d!!

2: Hi!lii2!"J'.18

clear his notion ot philosophy.

the refleotion on knowledge.

Collingwood does :make

Philosophy 1s conneoted w1 th

It does not think about an ob3ect.

"1t a.lwa.rs t Wh11e thlnk1ng about an:! object. thinks also about
its mm thought about that ob3eot • .,19
thought about thought.

Therefore philosophy 1s

Thought which seeks to disoover the dis-

tance of the earth from the sun would be a task tor that field

ot knowledge which we call astronoDl1
1 ?,mg.. p.

III

But the further prooess

lSS.

18Thls book though published posthUmously. in 1946.
by the edl tor of Col11ngwood' s unpub11shed notes and papers t T.
M. box, consists prlmartly ot thirty-two lectures wr1 tten during

the first six months of 1936, ent1tled "The Philosophy of H1stol'7".
1936 oal1ed
"Prinoiples ot History. to

and parts of a work undertaktm. in the spring of

19Colllngwooo. IdM of Bilk0D', p. 1.
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ot reflection tmareby

t'1e

cisely that 't'le a.re doing

would seek to discover what it is pre~~hen

we discover the distance ot the

earth i"rom the sun, is the task of philosophy, in th.is case,
either of logic or the theory of aClenoe. 20
Using the example of an historian golng about his work,
say examlning the military stature

ot Julius Caesar, in order

to clarify his thought, Collingwood distlnguishes What he con-

slders to be the task ot the psycholog1st, the philosopher"
and the historian.

The philosopher 1s concerned not just tdth

the past facts 1n themeslves as the historian 1s, nor w1 th the
historian t s thought prooesses in themselves as the psychologlst
ls" but rather with these two aspects precisely in the1r mutual.
relat1on.

For thought in relation to Its objeot 113 not Just

th.ou.p;,ht process but knowledge.

So what tor ps;rMologr 1s ma.tter

for a theory ot thought prooess, of mental events in abstraction
from any

ob~eet t

1s tor phlloso:phy the theo17 of knowledge.

The

psycholog1st asks: How do hlstor1a.ns think; the ph11osopherl
How do historianS, know.

The hlstor1an on the other hand grasps

the past as a. thing ln 1 tselt and tells us that so mo.u,y :rears
ago such...a.nd-suoh events aotual.ly happened.

ot the philosopher.

This 1s not the job

The philosopher is not concerned With past

events as things 1n themselves bUt as th1ngs known to the historian, that ls. what a.bout these particular past events that makes

it POSsible tor historians to know them.

-

20l,W_
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From ",mat we have sald above, we could call the phll.
osopher as he thinks about the sub3ective s1de of hIstory an
epistemolog1st and in so far a.s he considers the objectlve slde,

we could ca.ll him a metaphysicIan, always keepIng in mlnd that
this dist1nction does not allow us to treat the epIstemological

and m.etaphyslcal parte or his work separately since we cannot
separate the study of knoWlng tram the study of what 1s known. 21

Finall,.. since What we bave pres_ted is Coll1ngwood' s
idea ot the general Mtu.re at phl1osophlc.al thinking, what does
he specltleaJ.l,. mean When he qualif1es the tem

adding

pn3.1o§QB1'l;p:

by

!It "stOll?:

The phIlosophy ot history 113 the stud;r of historIcal
thl1lking: not only the pmrchologloal aMlysis of its actual.
prooedure, bat the analys1S of the ideal which it sets

betore 1 tselt .. Ristor1ca.l thought 1s one among a number
ot attitudes taken up b1 the I11nd towards the objeotive
~iorld; it 1s an attitude 'trh1oh ausumes that there eXists
a wo:rId ot tacts - not gene::al laws, rut individual facts
- .... 1ndependent of the being mOl-tn, and that it is possible.
it not whol.11 to discover these faots. at arrt rate to discover them 1n part and. approximately. 'l'he ph11osop~..y of:
hlsto17 must be a crt tical discussion of thls attltude,
its presupposltions and ita imp11cations; an attempt to
d1scoV'er 1 ts place in hl11lQD. exper1enoe as a whole. 1 ts
relation to other forms 01.' exper1ence. 1ts Origin a.nd its
valld1ty.22

21l21!l. t ;)p. 2-3.

22Collln;;"Wood • .:~lstoit11M soca.tt% ?;£S?9@~g,1m§, p. 161.

CHAPTER II
R. G. COLLINGWOOD'S
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

looking baok trom his fiftieth year, saw that his lite's work

tfhas beel'l in the main an a.ttempt to bring about a rtl:ePl9chemeSM
between philosophy and history." 1

In his investigations be

reached the conclusion that what was need»d was a. speaial branch

of phllosophleal inquiry which was exolus1 vely devoted to the
speoial problems ra.1sed by' historical. thlnk1ng.
In the judgment of T. M. Knox, the man who perhaps knew
him best and to whom Collingwood ent:rt1Sted his unpublished works,

thls ambition was best aoh1eved in the papers contained 1n the
book, Isle!

ot &s1a0ll. For

that reason the doctrine elaborated

1n this chapter is basicallY' that which Collingwood presented
1n this book.
For Collingwood the development of a philosophy ot his-

tory involved

tl<10

stages.

The first stage would be to work out

lcolllngwood, Autgbl9.SmW. p. 77.
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ph1losophy of

hlsto~

in a

relat1ve~

Isolated oondition, re-

garding th1s philosophy as a speoial study of a speoial problem.
The second stage would then attempt to work out the oonnectlons
between this philosophical study and the old traditional dOC-

trines.
only.

The

~g.M

Of

Ii&s1Q!rz was co11Oemed with the first stage

For 1t was to be a philosophical enquiry 1nto the nat'tl.re

ot hlstory, regarded as a. speclt1cally distinct form of knowledge
't'llth Its own distinct object.

'!'he seoond stage, tor the time

being, was simply not considered. 2
The first problem whloh must be taken up Iss Why 1s It
that history must be thought of as a specla.l branch of knowledge
and. thus worthy

ot

a speolal branoh

ot

philosophy?

The procedure

follOWed by Collingwood 1s to analyze the various torms of knoW-

ledge wh10h philosophY' has COl'lsldered in the past and to show
that they are not adequate to acoount tor the problems ra1sed
by the existence

ot hlstortoaJ. knowledge.

The viewpoints

ot ph1losoph1o speculat10n d.1tter W1 th

eaoh age according to the problems oalled forth at that particular time.
heritage.

Tbe history of' philosophy dates 'back to a Greek
The special task which Greek philosophers proposed

for themselves was the laying 01' the foundations of' mathematiCS
a.nd thus it 1s not at all surprtslng that their speoial interest

1n the theo1'7 ot knowledge would be based on math$lD8.tlcaJ. lmow-

-
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ledge.
SUch a development tlTould be opposed to the development
Of history, for hi story considers data and events that ooourred

1n spaoe and. t1me and are no

lo~er

happening whereas mathem.a.tl-

oal thlnking can be carried on only in so tar as 1 t a.bstraots

from space and t1Jae..

History, 1n so far as 1t 1s a sclence of

hu.t::1e.n act10n and considers things 'tmlch men have done in the
past, n.ommits itself to the concrete '\'Torld of ehange where
th1ngs come to be and cease to be.

Accord1ng to Colll1\;.q;wood,

the prevalent Greek metaphysical View during this period of

history considered such changeable things as Ul.'lkno'tmble. and
therefore history as
As a result

Bn

1mposslble scienee .. :3

ot their phl1osophie<:lJ. development along

mathematloaJ. lines, the science of

hlsto~

dunnt; the dominance

ot GreeJt cuJ.ture remained in a primitive state.
m.ore t..t.mn a mere aggregate of percept1ons.
affeoted their View of h1stor1eal eV1denae.
\'1aS

H1story was no

Thls, of (lourse,

Histortcal eVidence

1dent1fled With the report of facts given by eye'"o1tnesses

ot those facts.

The evidence itselt oons1sted ot eyewitnesses'

nal"rat1 ves and historical method consisted in bbtaln1ng e1 ther
directly or 1ndirectly these aooounts. 4
During the Middle Ages t theologloa1 oonsiderations ab-

~.t p. 20.

~.t

p. 24.
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sorbed the offorts of thinkers.

The dominant ooncer:n

l'mB

dis-

oovering more preoise knowledge about the relat10nship between
God. and man.

Therefore it tms in this area that philosoPhY'

centered its efforts.
,,\ga.in this atmosphere 1s not altogether healthy tor the
development ot refleotion on historioal
cal thln..ld.ng ha.e

For theolog1-

thm4,~ht.

tor 1 ts object a s1ngle Infln1 te object lmereas

historical events are fint te a.nd pl.uraJ..
H1stOr'9' 1 tself' developed ve'1!1 11 tt1e in the use of or1tieal appa.ra.tus beyond the Greeks.

However. in oonjunction 'td.th

the main preoccu.pation of the age, it toolt on a neVI interest,

the d1scovel'7 and exposition of' the divine plan '£'or h1stol"1.

Suoh a tum at events prevented d.evelopment of' h1stortog:raphy.

The

med1e~ hlsto~lan

depended

pr1~ll

for his facts and had no effectlve weapons for a.
ation of those tmd1tlons.

on traditions

c~tlcal

evalu-

In thIs atmosphere hls task: became

the discovering and expounding of the d.1 vine plan for the 'iforld
as 1 t was in the mind ot God...

ture as well as the past.

It assumed a knowledge of the fu-

Buell eschatolop;:3 is always an intru-

sive element In hIstory and. the prediotion of tutu.re events

g'lJ.es to a f'aulty conoeption ot h1stor1oe.l method.

Bl"-

The medieval.

coneept ot providence lett nothIng tor man to do and led histor1ans into the error of

future.

thlnk1~~

that they cOUld forecast the

OUr criticism of this age, however, must be tempered,

for no one had yet discovered the fundamental concept of the
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oritical examinat10n of sources and the soholarly substantiation

of fa.ots whioh

}laS

to be the work of histor1oal method. ln the

oenturies that followed.'?

W1 th the a.r.r1 valot our modern age and the great strides
forward made by' sclenoe both theoretloally a.nd in i te use tor
the pmctlcal 1mpl"Ove:tlents ot our sta.nda.rd ot 11v1ng. philoso-

phers became preoccupied with thought about sclentlfic m.ethod.
They became concerned about the relation of the human mind. as

subjeot to the natural world ot things as objeot.
Philosophy of history dld. not develop t"ully in this atmosphere because soient1fio lmowledge finds truth

through

ob-

servatlon and experiment exempllt1ed 1n what we perce1ve, whereas historical knowledge finds truth in events Which never can
be

d1rect17 percel ved. because they are past and cannot be du-

pl1cated exper1mentally because they eao1'1 contain an element
that 1s unique.

Nevertheless history grows Where eo crit1cal, scientific
sp1n t dominates slnoe sources such as eyewitness a.ocou.nts or

historians ot the past are no longer aoceptf!td a.s authorities,
but a.re now put to the test as methods are developed to test

their authentloity.

Though the growing Qutonom1 of historical

thought reSisted total absorption in the posit1visti0 spirit,
1t did not fully ga1n 1ts autonom,y.

This is Been, for one ex-

SJnple. in the rules which historians d.eveloped in the1r treatment
r

'?ib1d., pp. 52-56.

1
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of facts:
(1) Each fact was to be regarded as a thing cape.bl.e of
be1ng aseerta1ned by a sepa.rate act of cogni tlon or process of research. and thus the total fleld of tbe h1storically knowable was out up into an lntln1 ty ot minute facts
each to be separately considered. (il) Each tact was to
be thought of not only' as Independent of all the rest but
as independent ot the knower. so that all subjective elements (as they were called) in the historian' S point ot
vi ..f bad to be e11m1nated. '!'he historian must :pass no 6
judgment on the facts: he must only say what they were.

SUch an att1tude prevented the further development of
hlstorioal method tor 1t h1storians refuse to

ju~'Se

the f'aots.

this means that history can only be the history ot external

events. not the history of the thought out ot t<1h1oh these events
grew.

This standstill in development was due to a false a.na.logy

between soientific and historical facts, scientific and h18t01"1eal

~m;ys

of knowing.
SolellOe tends to ignore the distinotion between h18to17

and natural sclence, or historical prooess and natura.l prooess.
It starts from the positiV1stic pr1nolp1e that n.atural sc1ence
1s the onlY' true form of knowledge and this princ1ple implies
that a.l.l prooesses are m.tural processes.

'!'.he problem of the

historian is how to avoid this principle.
The soient1st tends to regard h1stor.y as an objeot confronting the historian in the same way in wh1 ch na.ture oonfronts
the scientist.

The task of understanding. evalua.tlng, or ori-

ticlzing history 1s done by' the historian standing outside of

6~•• p. 131.
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it.

This results in the loss of the sPlr1tuallty or subjec-

tiVity which properl.y belongs to the historical life

ot mind

The histor1oa.l prooess is oonverted into a m.tural

1 tself' •

prooess.

It simply is not tl'tle that tbe historian stands out-

side history t because 1t 1s be Who must reoreate 1n h1s own .m1nd

the past events ot history- for wh1ch he has ev1denoe.

Th1s re-

creation ot pa.st events 1n the h1storian's mind 1s how the past
His subjE)Otlv1ty 1s an essential part ot
historlca.l method. in a. WIa"I' it 1s not in seientif10 method. 1
lives in the present.

F'urthermore sclenee mme.rl17 ls lnterested 1n generalizations which although veritled in partieular 1nstances are

valid independent of them.

History never is interested in gen-

eralization for its own sake.

H1sto17 beg1ns and $Dds With its

pnmary interest the unlque quality

ot particul.ar h1stor1oal

events wtdoh scientific method cannot capture.
A meteorologist studJ. as one eyelone in ol"der to compa.re
1 t ld th others, boping to find out what features 1n them all

are constant.

i"be histor1.a.n 1n Ms work has no sucb aim.

It

one f1nds h1m studying the H1.1.!'ldred Years War or the Revolution

of 1688 t one cannot tnter that he 1s 1n the pre11minary stages

of an enquiry into the constant factors involved. in wars or
revolutions 1n general.

It he 1s 1n any prellminarJ stage at

au, 1t is more llkel.y to be a generaJ. study ot the Mid.dle Ages

or the Seventeenth Centur;y.

-

1Ib d ... p. 176.

'!'he reason. 1s that the soienoes of
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observation and hIsto17 are organlzed 1n different ways.
meteorol~gy

observation ot thIs

partlOtl~ar

oyclone 1s cond!tIoned

OW Its relation to ,1het has been observed about
;Jlth hlsto.ry,

Wile.t

In

othe~

oyolones.

1$ knO".m about the Hundred Years War 1s not

conditioned '07 what 1s known about other

1'larS Ot'tt

by tifhat 1s

knOwn about other events and people within the context of the

I<11ddle Ages. 8

30 1 t

seems o.lear that

the ph,1losophio

vlewp~lnts

t)f the

three ages of thought have not either singly or together adequately provided 'tor the ex1stenoe of hIstorIcal knowled.e;e.
"-lhy

hadn't these ages been

of the problems raised by'

tl~elous

hlstor1~~l t~lnk1ng?

The reason was that histoncal knm!ll&d.ge had. not yet
forced 1 tself into the (\onBclousness of ph11osophers by raisIng
special
and

d1tflaultl~$ whl~~

stu~

to meet them"

wOUld demand a special technique

\<1hen thls d.id. happen somewhere Wi thin

the nineteenth eentu.l'7, the s1tuatlon was that the ourrent
theories of lmowle<lze were preoceupled w1 th the speo1eJ. pro-

blems of soience and had been

the study of mathematics
100.1 methods,

~r1Dg

up

wo~k1ng

on a tl9.d1t1on based. on

a.nd theolo~ t whs!'$as the new h1storeve~erel

were lett una.ooounted for ..

The de.'llSnd was oreated tor a speoltlc lnctU1r.v into thls new
gl'OUp ot philosophlc problems created by' the eT..1stenoe of or-

8l£?a4. I p. 250.
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ganized and systtrmat1zed historical resea.rch.

This new inquiry

has justly come to be c~lled philosophy of hlstOry.9

It is to

this lnctU1ry that we een say Col11ngwooc. ha.s :made a sizable con-

tribution.

Whe.t

1s

1;0

follow 1s Collingwood t s philosophy of

history. his phenomenological analysis of historical thin.k1ng.
Collil"t£J10od's 1 n§lgh~

lnio knowledge.

Through Collingwood' s

experience as an archaeologist and historian. a basio lnsight
W'l'.1S

grasped which

'!;,tf8,S

to

arf~c.t

all his philosophical work.

The

insight came sometime wh'_l. he was work1ng on exea.vatlons ot
RO!!la..71

oamps in Brt tal:n around 19131
At the same time I found !!'tyself experimenting 1n a

laborato17 of Imowledge: at first asking myself a q111te

vague question. such as: "was there a Flavtan occupation
on this slte?" then dividing that quest10n into varIous
heads and puttlng the first in some such form as this:
"are these Flsvia.n sherda and coins mere stals, or were
they 1eposlted In the period to whloh they belong?" and
then aonsidering all the possIble ways in Which llght could
be thrown on this q,uestlon, a.nd putting them into praotioe
one by one, until at last I could sal. "Tbere was a FIaVian oocupatlon: a.n earth .Alld timber fort of suoh and suoh
plan was bull there 18 chjr;:,.r a + b and abandoned tor
suoh and such :.:-eaSOl'lS in the year x + 1." Expen.enee soon
taught me that·· under these laboratory' cond.i tlol'lS one to\U'1d.
out nothl~ at all except In answer to a question; and not
a vague one eIther, but a detinite one. That When one
dug &a11r~ merely, -Let us see ~Rhat there 1s here". one
learnt nothlng, exoept casually 1n so tar as casual questions arese In one's mind while diggings "Ia tha.t blaok
stuff peat or oooupatlon-sol1? Is that a potsherd under
your foot? Are those loose stones s ruined wall?" That
what one learnt depended not merelT Oft What turned up
in one's trenohes but also on what questlons one was asKlng; so that a man wtlo was Elsk1ng questions ot one klnd
learnt oue l::1nd ot thing from a plece ot d1gg1ng wh1ch to

-

".

.'11'

9.Dlii. t PP. 5-6.
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.~nother

man revealed something d.1tfe!"ent. to a third. some-

th1ng 1llusory, and to a fourth nothing at all. 10

The importance of this 1.nsight 1s emphasized bl the tact

that we frequently attempt to criticize before we understand.
Because of this. it is important to know what questions we are
seeldng to answer.

When our questions are answered, then 1s the

t1me for criticism.
This same 1nsight or ¥aT ot proceed1ng was adopted by
Collingwood in his leotures.
expert 1n Ar1stotle.

He had become something of an

In speaklng about the .!a Ant.. , he con-

oentrated on the question "What is Aristotle saying and what
does he mean?"

He did not go 1nto the further question of whe-

ther what he means or sa1's 1s tl"tle or not..

He Wished to convey

to his audiences the need tor a scholarJ.y approaoh to the ph1losophlcal text pr10r to any process ot crltlo1sm. l1
BeSides h1s work as an archaeologist, there were other
occasions, some of them quite prosaic, which re-emphaslzed his

1nsight into the

know1Dt~

process.

Collingwood refleots on one

suoh occasion which occurred a year or so after the outbreak of
World War I.

At that time he was 11 V1ng 1n London and working

tor the Royal Admiralty Intelligence DIV1s1on whioh had taken

over the quarters ot the Royal Geographical Sooiety.

F~eh

day

he had to walk across Kensington Gardens past theUbert Memorial

-

... _

lOColllngwood. A~2bl0SraP~t pp. 23-25.
ll~ •• pp. 27-29.

. . . ,.......

. . . . . . 111

0.."_
..._ __
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i:n suoh N\d tanto, the.t the queat'.on oeou!"'l"ed to him: WhY' had

Sct')tt (arch1 teet) d.one 1 t?

i"hat follows 1 s the proeegs nf though

which rlev el oped. in. CoUlngW'Ooo'g mind:
Why had Soott don~ 1 t? To sa:r thAt seott 'tfaS a bad
architect was to burke the problem w1th a tautology; to
MY' that there was no aeeou.ntl!\:~ for tastes wag to evad.$
1t by til ~,sta~o r!J.sa,. What relat10n was there, I began
to ask myse:

etw~n """'At he hnd dons a.nd tm.q,t he had

J

tried to do? Had he tried to produce a beautitul thingJ
a. thln~, I nll!..'l.n.t, ?Th1eh we ghon.1d h~ve thour;ht. beautiful?
It so. he ha.d of course tailed. But had he perhaps been
tl"11!'~ t" produce something dJ.tte:rent?
It so, be m1.ght
poss1bly haTe succeeded. It I found the monument merely
loathsome, lro.e th.~t perha.!,s m..T fault? Was I loold.ng in
1 t for quall ties 1 t d1d not possoss, an.d a1 the::- ignorir.g
or des~is1n~ thone it d1d112
This experienee as he waJ.ked past the Memorial led Colt~ fo~~late

lingwood

answer
by

pr~')eess.

a prino1ple regarding the

q~estlon

It 1s It!l!>Qsalble to rind out what a man means

simply ntudy1ng h1s spoken or written statements even

that the individual has
sen

med1u~

and

~

thoroughly oompetent grasp ot the cho-

ot oODmntnlcat1on and a perfectly

To dlsoover his meaning

~~,ntlng

somethl~

is a question, a question Tfh1eh

t~lthful

This "more"

more 1s demanded"

~s

in the mind

~~

intent1on.

this part1-

cular individual and whleh 1s pre8U!lled by him to be in yours ..

What he hns

sald~ ~r

was mennt to be

-

written. or eo~nleated in any other way

Anfll'lSWer

12~bid •• pp. 29-30.

13

-b

tit

p. 31.

to a p~nlou1.al" quest1on. i )
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From experienoes suoh as those related above, ~ollln~wood concluded that all advances in knowledge came as answers to
(). definite set of quest1ons..
You don't lea.rn by

lookl~

Thinking means asking questions.

at real1ty with

a.

blank mind..

How

significant this insight 1s for the historian will become apparent as we proceed in the ana.lysis of

historica~

thought.

For

Collingwood, no intelligent inquiry into any subject could proceed without it.
Collingwood did not feel he had discovered something new
even though he did thinlc that he had discovered the importance
of a process negleoted by many modern thinkers:

These questlonsare not put by one man to another man
in the hope that the seoond man l~ll enlighten the first
man's ignorance by answerln.-s them. They are put, llke
all soientific quest1ons, to the scientist by himself.
This is the Sooratio idea whioh Plato was to express by
defin1~:. thought as "the dialogue of the soul 1:<1'1 th i tself tt , where Plato's own literary practioe makes it olear
that by dialogue he meant a process of question and answer.
w~en Socrates taught his young pupils by asking them questions, he was teaching them how to ask questions of themselves, ~~d shOwing them by examples how amazingly the obscurest subjeots can be illuminated by asking oneself intelligent questions about them instead. of simply gaping at
them, according to the prescription of our modern antiscientific epistemologists, in the hope that lmen we have
mL~e our minds e perfect blank we shall "apprehend the
facts" .14
The

obl~c~

,of historical 1nqUity.

Our inquiry into historical

thoW:;ht uill start with the question: "tIhet is the object of historic"'!.l in.qlllry?

Collingwood defined the object of historioa.l

14Coll1~s~oodt Idea of Hlstoty, p. 274.
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inquiry as npast human aotions."
These "human aotions" are further defined a.s
admit of

events that

It is precisely because of thls fact that

tho~:?,htll.

history has a claim to a separate form of

knowled~e,

gets at thought, the inslde of aotion, ln

SI.

solences do not.

lI

for history

-r.my the natural

The oocurrences ln nature are mere events,

that ls, not the aots of agents "'mose thought the sclentist
attempts to trace.

For the scientist nature is a "phenomenon".

We do not mean that it is somehow lack1ng in real1ty but rather
ls cons1dered as a being presented to the SCientist for his intelligent observation.

But h1storical events are not "phenom-

enon" presented for intell1gent observat1on.

They are events

whlch the historian does not look at but through to discern the
thought within them.

By penetrating to the "inside" of events,

the historian is doing something which the method of the solentist neither demands or permits. 1S
Human action is oonoeived by Colllng't'lOod as thought expreSSing itself in external behaVior.

Although historians must

start from the merely physloal or desoriptions of the merely
Physioal, their objeot is to penetrate behind these to the thought
which underlies them.

They may start With the fact that a man

called Itlulius Caesartf on a oertain day in 49 B.C. orossed the
River Rubioon l'11th suoh-and-sueh foroes.

15Ibld., p. 214.

But th1s 1s not the

)6
goal 01" h1storical inqu1r.y..

Bistor1ans want to go on and dis-

oover what was 1n Caesar's mind. what mot1 vated. these exte:maJ.
bOdily movements.

When th1s transit10n is made, then

then do human act10ns become tull;y 1ntel11glble.

Q.nd

only

The object ot

historical. 1nquiry is not a. mere event. but the thought expressed
in it.

It you disoover the thOUght, then you understand the

event.

Onoe

1'00

know th. faots in this tull sense, there 1s DC

fUrther process ot 1nqul17 1nto causes.

For in know1ng what

happened, the histor1an also knows why it MPpened.. 16
Th1s passage trom. the merely phy's1oa.l acti v1 ties ot

human beings to a penetration 01' the1r inner thoUghts ha.s been
expressed by the d.istinct1on (made tamous by COllingwood) between the "1nside" and "outside'" ot an event:
The historian 1nvest1gating an::r event in the past, makes
a distinct10n betw.en what BaT be called the outs1de and
the inside ot an event. By the outside or the event I
DleaD everything belonging to it wtd.oh can. be desor1bed in
tems ot bodies and thel~ movements, the passage ot Cusar,
aocompanied bJ oerta1n men, across a nv.r called the llubloon at one date. or the spl1Ung ot h1s blood on thetloor
ot the senate house at another. By the inside of the event
I mean that 1n 1 t which can onl1 be cleaer1bed in tel'7lS 01'
thought; caesar's d8t~e8 ot Republican Law or the clash
ot oonstitut1onal policy between hlmself and b1s assassi1l8. 1
though Colllngwood dist1nguiShed the inside and outs1de

ot an action, he does not want us to think that history is concerned excluaivell with thought.
16Colllngwood,

Blstorical investigation does

Id. or Histon.

17I~A., p. 21,.

p. 214.
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not allow a oonoern with one and not the other.
1s

investlgatl~

The hIstorian

not mere events (somethlnp, whioh has only an

outside and no inside) but aotions.

An aotion 1s the unity of

the inside and outside of an event.

The historian is interested

in the orossinR of the Rubioon as related to Republican Law or
the spilling of caesar's blood as related to the oonstitutional
confliot.

l!e may start with the disoovery of the outside of an

event, but the goal of his inquiry Is not reaohed until he has
thought himself Into the aotion and discerned the thoughts of
the a~ents involved. 18
At the same time

Colli~~ood

is insistlng on the ooncern

of the historian for both inside and outSide of historical aotions, he

a~its

that ultimately the historian's ohief interest

1s in hIstOrical thought:

Unlike the 'I18.tural sOientist, the historian is not
conce:i:neo. w1 th events as such a.t all. He i& only ooncerned with those events whloh are the outward. expression
01' thouKhts, and is only concerned ~/lth these in so fa.x' as
they a::qn~ess thow,;hts. At bottom, he 1s concerned ~d.th
thoughts alone; with their outillard. expression in events
he 1.8 concern.ed only by the way, in so far as these reveal
to hill the thoughts of which he 1s i:n search .. l ?
It should be noted tha.t the definition of hl.Uflan action
eliminates from history the study of the objects of natural

SCience, acts of brutes, and the indel1beral;e

act~

of man,

that ls, !..<J.an's oonduct in so far a.s it 1s determined by what may

---~--_ _ _ _
• __
• ___
• _____
• __________________
• _ _ _ _ _ _• _
________
• ______________
. _ ._ _
u _
_ _ _ _ _ _ __

18Ib14.
19Ib1d., p. 217.
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1J~

calle(l h1,r: an1mal ne.ture, his impulses e.nd appet1 tes.

essence of these acts 1s their outside.

The

They si1!lply have no

inside and thus cannot be a proper object of historical stUdy.20
A o.uestlon l'Thich naturally arises from the above distinction

~,rou1d

be: In ?That sen.se do these events

~'T1 th

no inside

influence the proper objeot of historical inquiry since to hold
that they have no effect on historical act10ns 1s patently absurd?

It

seems certa1n tha.t if Lord Nelson's sh1p sprang a leak

e.t the oo.ttle of

Tmfal~ar,

even thour:h Hs!>ringln.:?:

9.

lea.k"

has no inside, it certa1nly would seem to have histor1oal s1gnifioanoe.
Collln~10od'~

cl~ar.
eatln~

treatment of th1s obvious objeotion is

luI men have aerta-in thine::s in

when they are

hun~ry,

or

comr~'lon,

sleepl~~

for example,

When they are tired.

But these functions have aboolutely nothing of lnterel::t to the
h1stoI1.a~.1.

Of themselves

e~.tlnc~

emc.. sleepi11£:; Sore

as these phys101''01c.a1 facts uffect hu..TJk"?n

they &re of concern.

~ct1on

c-:niT:"~l

appc-

8.nd thour::ht

They ha.ve h1stor1cal s1gnif1cance 1n so

far as, for example t they affect the actions a man might perform because of his

Ol'1n

and his children's empty stomachs, or in

so far as poverty is related to the rioh explo1t1ng the poor for
tl-telr own ends.

It is ma,n's thoUl:;ht about these merely physio-

39
loglcal facts which can have historical slg~~floanoe.21
Some (to take another example) have attributed the deoline of the Roman empire to a. fall in agricultural produetlor..
owing to the exhaustion ot the so11 1n some regions.

The hls-

torian 1s not interested actuall.y wl th the fact that thls so11
1s exhausted.

In itself, this

t~aet

is of no sign1ficance.

It

can have lmporta.n.ce only in relation to a human being or belngs.
And then

it bas significanoe only in that it presents a problem.

to be thoUght about.

How can th1s so11 be :replen1shed?

it can't be I then how can one eontlnue to live on a farm
exhausted so11?

How

It
111 th

can we find another source of agl1.oultural

Thus events with no insid.e ot their own can have value

produ.oe?

to the historian 01ll11n so t'al.· as theT affect the thought and
aotions of' man.

was exhausted.

The Roman empire d1d not fall because the earth

but because 1n thlnldng abou.t this problem. the

Romans did not come up w1 th a course of e.et1on adequate \0 the

problem. 22
We oan say. 1n su:mmary, that for

Colll~10od

ot historical inqu1ry 16 past human aotions.

the obJect

'l'hese human ac-

tions are those which ad.m1t ot thought. the inside of human
aetiVity.

All ovento llhlch have only an outs1de (the eruption

21Ib14., p. )lS.

or n..

22Alan Donagan., The I&ter Ph~lOSO~
(Oxford: ClaJtendon Press, 1962) I PP. 203- 6.

G. Colll!!t'!oo!t

of

Q

volcano, a.n empty stomach) have no histor1oal s1gnificance

except 1n so far as they affeot the thought involved in hUl1'J.Q.n

actions.

historical inqUlZ"'Y' is past human actiOllS. how do I go about
answering the questions pu.t to that object by the historian. What
has happened?

When did 1t happen?

Why did it happen?

The only

way I can answer these questions about the past is by re-think1ng

past thoughts.

1118to17 as a science is nthe re-enactment at

past thOUght in the histOrian's own mind. ,,23

Some examples to 11lustrate this general defin1tion are
in order.

I have before me a letter written by F11nT the gov-

ernor of B1 thynla to the i-aperor Trajan conoerning the treat-

ment of Christ1ans in th1s proVinee.

Now a man who th1nks his-

torically has before him this document, th1s re110 of the past.
His Job is to disoover what the past was which bas lett this document behind it.

There are here certa.1n written

l10rdS

and. the

histOrian must discover what was meant by the person who wrote
them.

This means d1scoTeribg the thought expressed 1n the words

and in th1s process thinking those same thoughts again tor

h~

sel1'.21+

As another example let us s$1 we have an h1storlan who
23col11ftgWood, AdM pC Hists!". p. 215.
24~ •• p. 283.
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has bofore himself a. oertain ecU.ct of an emperor.

For him. mere-

ly to rood the l'Jords of the docu.:ment and to be able totra.nslato them Into his Olm. langns.ge does not rtMn he 1s a;tfa.rE;l ot
thoir hIstorical r:lgnltle..!4nce.

enVisago th.e
(I.nd vtell" It

s1tU2>t~.on

l11th 'tt.,"'hleh the emperor lTas try1ng to deal

trom the r;ame point ot violl.1'

he mu.nt see tor hImself just
hOl;t

In ordel' to reach thIS, he must

~.O

If he

the a1 ttt9.tlon might be dee.l t

1'11 th;

~\s

the 6.'nperor had..

1.10re 1n

Then

the emperor's shoes

he must see the various

alternatIves, the reasons for choosing one courso of act10n rather than another.

He thus re-enncts in his

perience ot the EtT.'lpel'or..
distinot from a

me:t'f~ly

In this

11,S.Y

Olfn

mind the

eX-

he has an hIstorical (as

phI101o.t;lcal) knoulec'tge of the :loa.nine

of the c:i1ct. 25
By ro-enacting l).;.""tst thott[,ht., an histol1.an 'HIll in this

one act anst-rer 8.11 the Q.ueot1onf1 of history, for the re-th1rlk1ng
of past thonght mes.ns that the hlstor1e.:n han c1.pprf)hell...ded. all the

facts of the case.

Therefore, thore 15 no further process of'

inquiring into the1r causes..

tJ,hen the historia.n lmows l'lhat

happened t he a.lrea(l1 knows )11.y 1 t

h~ppcned.

CIne of' Collingwood. t s ravon te examples for 111ustra.,tlng

pOints of h1s theory was Admiral Nelson at the battle of
ga.r:

'r~~fal-

42
It I 10'101'1 what Nelson dtd at the battle of Trafalgar
• • • I also know wbJ' 'he did it. becau.se I make his thoughts
mine and pass from one to another as I should In l1lY own
thiDk1l1g. I haft no need ot &nJ' genua1 lmOW'ledge ot the

behaviour of admirals tn sea battles to atta1n thIs understand1Dg. It is not, in t1l.ot, a _tter of d1sourslve. bUt
of immediate knol'llet\ge. But lt 1s only' this because thought
and only thought 1s in questlon. 26

The reascm we oan d..tUe h1etory as the re-enactment ot
past thought, 1s the d1stlnoti<>n which Coll1ngwood made between

the inside and the wtslde ot an eyet.

that a. past act as well was 4ea4

tOl'$"t$l:'.

a.eth1ftg that oeu14 tansc.e.d t1m..

He felt 1t was olear

However thOUght was

W'lthth1s distinction

h~

felt tbat be was able to dO .'D7 nth those who obJeoted to the
po••lblllty fit a re-...otflem ot past thO'tlght.

1'0 those Who

wou.1d olaim it abwrd to th1nk that the same id.entical act could

happen tlfloe he would sa., that .. past act of thought in lts pbJ-

steal context: cannot be :re-11 ved since physical quall t1es pass
atfa7 in the tlOt., of' ocmsolOtlmtf)ss.
d1stlnet

Bltt thought, since 1 t 18

trom. the merelY' phyal cal t eArl be oaptul"ed. and regained

1n 1ts entlret,..

So tar as experience cons1sts of 1I.e1'$ con-

ae1o'l1sness ot sensa.tions and fee11ngs pure and simple. it 1s

true to -1 a past ennt has been carried away torever.

But

an act ot thought 1s not just sensation and teel.1lJg.

It 1s
knolIledge 1tb1oh is more tIt_ l_Gd1ate C0J18C1OUSMS8. 21
Collingwood. constdered 1 tone ot the wond.rous peoU:U.ar-

1t18. of thought tbat it oould survive ohanges 1n Physloa1

co~

text:
The peouliarity of thought 1s that, in addit10n to
ooourring here and now in this oontext, it oan sustain itself through a ohange of oontext and revive in a d1fferent
one • • • • The self-identity of the act of thinkine that
these two angles are equal is not only independent of such
matters as that a person performing it is hungry and cold,
and feels his chair hard beneath him, and is bored with
his lesson: it is also independent of further thoughts,
such as that the book says they are equal or the ma.ster
believes them to be equal. 28
Inside myself, I can revive one and the same act of
thought.
t~le

For example, I learn for the first time that it is

that I can prove the existence of God from an examination

of finite reality.

Three months later, I can revive this iden-

tical same act of thought.

It is true that the first disoovery

of a truth differs from any later contemplat1on of it.

But

the differenoe is neither in the truth nor in the aot.

Rather

1t is that the immediaoy of the first aot ean never be oaptured
again.

The jolt which a ne't'O' insight gives, the freedom following

the solution to a

perplexi~~

problem, the triumph of achievement,

all these immediate experienoes oonnected with the first act of
insight are what we QeJmot re-eapture. 29
It should be made clear and explicit at th1s point that
Colll!lgi1mod is insisting that my act of thought and the act of
thought that Julius caesar had which I am trying to re-think are
not similar acts but identioally the same acts.

28Ib1d., p. 297-298.
29Ib1d.

Hls positlon ls clear 1n attempt1ng to answer objectors
lfho say that slnce the acts take place ln two dlfferent persons
they are two dlstlnct acts..

He uses

B.S

an exam.:ple a. situation

where a la.pse of tllne over a lengthy period is involved.

If

't'1e take the two persons lnvolved, Euclid G.nd myself, and we grant
that the interval of time laps1ng is no ground for deny1ng that
the two aots of thought are really one and the same, the further
question must be asked: Is the d1fferenoe between Euolid and
myself ground for deny1ng the identity of the two acts?

Col11ng-

wood oontended that there ex1sts no tenable theory of personal
,. dent 1 ty wh1ch would oontrad1ct his posl tlon.

Euclld a.nd I are

not like two typewr! ters whlch, beca.use they a,re not the same
typel~ter,

can never perform the same act but only acts of the

kind.

A

And to say

my

sa.me

mind ls not a ma.chlne but a complex of aotlv1tles.
act of thought and Euclld' s cannot be the same

because they are part of a dlfferent complex of activities is an
unproved assertion. YO
Colli~food

olaims that those who object to his posltlon

implic1tly assume that identical acts of thought can and do
happen.

-

For the objeotor to

Colll~~ood

malntalns:

that although the object of' two people's acts of thought
may be the same, the acts themselves are different. But,
in order that this should. be said, it is necess.ary to mati
"t\That someone else is think1ng" not only in the sense of
knowlng the same objeot that he knows, but in the further
sense of knowing the sam.e act by whlch he knows it: for
the statement rests on a claim to know not only my o~t.n act
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ot knOw1ng bltt someone else's also, and compare them.
But what makes such comparison possible? A!q'one who can
parrent idte compar1sonaust be able
retleet "1.q 80' of
Jm.oWledge is thlstt - and then he repeats ita Mhora the ..,.
he ~ks. I can see that his act 18 th1s" -- and then he

"0

repeats it. Unless that can be done, the oomparison oan
never 'be made. But to do this 1l1'VOlYes the repetltlol). b1
()ne mind. ot anotherta act ot ~t: not one l1ke 1t bu.t
th.·~et ltaelt.31
.
~

Co111DgWOO<i

argtl••

tor the ldentltloaticm of 117 Mt of

thought and the thou.gl\t ot the h1stoJ'loal pers0l'lBg8 I
be

8'ttI.d.71Dg

OIl

happen

to

the ground that It I eould. 01'll1' think the _ .

thought oentent of

oa..~

aM not rev1'Y. Caal!fU'f s

2.0. ot think...

lug, then I could Dever know tJbat ., thought. were Identical
1I1th h1s.

How oould I SJA7 I . . eat OUsa:r thoughtlt I

CUltt

rertve hls aot o.t thought?
Coll.1DgwoOd tee1s he bas shown wb1' 1 t 1s .....8a17 to
hold tbat ttuta ot thOQgbt cq be detaohe4. h'OIl their telt baoJt..
ground lt1th pertee' leg1t1l1tao7. tor 1t 18 because 'they oan that

Ms'or.?" 18 possible and Is PNpeJlf deser1bed as a

ft ... _tlleat

of past experl...... 32

ane ot the _tift. 1:iehlBd COUizagwoM·. 41stlnotlon betnen thought and telt

the I.Btl14e aa4 out814. of

baO~d.,

..,ents ..... a deep-seated tea:!' of histor.l.oal s.eptlola.

wenta

OUt

neve" 111 thell' totaltt7 be re-oapture4,

'1~, •• p.

80

.Past

how could

288.

'2w. Vol.
B. Walsh, "ColJ.1n6wood s PhllosophJ' of IU.story,
22, (1947), p. 157.

lbl19§2BbI.

t

n

'N'e ever

knO't'1

them to be true?

But thouJ!)lt, since it is not

llm1ted to time and place, could transcend thls obstacle and
a1101'1 the historian to get inSide the actions of hIstory..

001-

1lng;'ttlood, hmiTever, has never tal{en the time to detal1 preclsely
hOlf it 1s that

~'le

go about re-thlnlcine; these past thoughts.

In SQlil'tllary,

~le

can say tho.t the questiori.s put to past

huma.n actions (lmat happened? 't'lhy dId it happen? v1hen did it
happen?) can be answered by the re-enactment of past thought.
;rhere 1s a sense in which a :past act of thOUght, either my
own or someone else's oan be revived by me now,

tho~~h

the same preoise physioal background as it had before..
disti~~ish

not with
We can

thought from its context of felt baokground because

aots of thOUght are not mere oonstituents of the temporal f1m'1
of consoiousness, but things which can be sustained over a stretch
. ''', of time and revived after an inte:rva1.

II

proposition of

Euclid oan be oontemplated by a person for several seconds and
aGain can be brought to mind after my attention has
from it.

l~dered

If I ask how many acts of thinking are here involved,

the al1SWer is one only.

If this holds for my own aots of think-

ing, it holds also when I am dea11ng with other people's thoughts.
Because 't<Te can dist1nguish thought from its 1mmedia.te context,
knol'lledge of the past becomes a real possi bili ty.
~-thi~lng past thoughts: object

.ru::

means Of hlsto:riegJ: lMuJ,rx?

~Je

have decla.red human actions

to be the goal of historical inquiry in the first part of our
anal sis of histor1cal thought.

Then \,le said that the re-
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think1ng of past thought is what makes historical knowledge
possible.

The question now arises as to the relationship of

these two elements.
means to end?

Is there present here a relationship of

Is the re-th1nk1ng of past thoughts the means by

which I get to past human aots?

If it is not a means to end,

in what sense 1s it the goal of historical inquiry?

Another way

of pos1ng the same question would be to ask: Is the re-think1ng
of past thoughts a part of historioal method, or part of the goal
wh1ch any h1storical method ought to achieve?
The prec1se role that the re-think1ng of past thoughts
plays in the theory of history worked out by Coll1ngwood is
simply not clear from h1s own writ1ngs.
the disputes among his oommentators.

This 1s obv1ous from

We adopt a v1ew here wh1ch

seems to be most oonsistent w1th the whole of Col11ngwood's
theory:
Collingwood undoubtedly thought that historians must
re-think the thoughts inside past actions in order to explain them, but he d14 not consider such re-th1nk1ng to
be 1ntuit1ve. • • • To re-th1nk sign1fioant past thoughts
1s part of the end an historian strives to aooomplish; it
is not even the whole of it, for he must also both demonstrate that he has re-thol~ht them, and use them to explain
past aotions. Collingwood's interpreters have mistaken
h1s descriptions of an element in the goal of historical
inqu1ry for descriptions of historical method; • • • Few
commentators have reoognized either that Collingwood acknowledged that imaginative reoonstruotions of past thoughts
are corr1gible and, 1n a sense hypothetical; or that he
rejected the v1ew that an h1storian who suoceeds in re-

thiDk1ng a past thougbt ...t int.ltl.ely knOW that he has

done

.0."

We IlU8t understand thent the re-th1nJd.ng of past though:'.
as an el.ent ln the goal of historical lnqutry, not as a means
to the end.

B.... thll'lk1Dg past thought is a oon41 tlon for the

pos81bl11t, of historical knowledge.

The sublect matter on

whloh the hi8torian labors rea111 is not the past as such,' but
the past whose ertdRce we can understand, the past 1n so far
a8 we know 1t.

To call h1story past aotuallt,. exoept 1n so

far as we know 1 t, would. mean setting up an 1ntN.1".11Ountable barrier between the h1storlan and the past, betw.en knower and the
objeot to be known.

H1story 18 the knowledge wh10h we have of

th18 pa8t, and to cons1der lt apart trom the oond1tlons ln human oognition whloh make 1t po••lble, 18 111egltl11&t..

Colllng-

wo04 then bas slmply re-d.flned the object of history (hwaan
aotioftS) ln terJU of what ln th••e aotloM ls able to be

mown.

naIle11. past thoughts.

the goal of hlstorieal In<l1l1l'7t lIbat 18 the aeans b7 -Mob I
Gall

accomp11sh tMs gcal?
1118t017'. then, 18 a sole... , but a solence of fA. speclal
k1D4. It 18 a selenee who.e buslness 1s to study even's
not acoeallbl. to ~ obl.nation, and. to stwIT the.e
e"ents lnterel1tlallJ. argu1ng to thea from soae1miag e18e

))AlaD Donagan, "The Verltieatloll of B1storloal Thes18" t
Pb11980phlMl -d.rk, Vol. , (19,6). pp. 199-200. It should
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\'Jhioh 1s aocessible to our observation, an.d which the
historian calls evidence for the event in which he is
interested.3l.j·
Evidence then, is socond best beoause past events are
not present except in terms of the monuments, documents, or testimony in which they now exist.

It 1s from this point that we

can make inferences to the past and can conolude that a certain
partioular past action presupposes this particular thought.
It is in relation to evidence

~nd

the inferenoe to past

thought that the oft repeated phrase in historieal Circles,
naIl history is contemporary history" is understood.

'rhis is

true because the past must somehow still be alive in the present.

In order that a past event can be said to have left a

IItrace" of 1tself in the present world, whioh is evidenoe of its
existenoe for the historian, this trace must be something more
than a material body.

We can, for example. suppose that a cer-

tain medieva.l king granted lan{i to the m.onastery of Cluny and
that the charter recording this grant has been preserved to our
own

d.~..l.Y,

a bro'l'm anti aged pi eel'?; of :paper covered

strange black x:lP.rks.

NO'N if

~~1 th

cert::.ln

noth1ng else save th1s parchoent

survived. from the Midile Age. into the world of tod3.y, then th1s
parchment Y!ould not serve as eVld.ence of' the isrant as far as the

lIoder.n h1Btorl:3.n is concerned..

-

To ta.}:e o:nly one example, the

be noted that the two most prominent author1ties on 6011i~ood
are Donagan and the editor of idles of RistoU. T. M. Knox.34Coll1ngwoodt Idea of H~storz, p. 252.

SO
knOWledge of Latln su.rv1ves.

It lt hadn't, the P8.l:'ehment could

never baV8 told the hlsterle what 1n rut 1 t doe. 'ell hill.
The m.odem hlstor1a.a oan stud7 the M14dle Ag$s becaue the, are
not dea4.

This 18 true because their wntl!lg8. paintlngs. eto.

are stl11 1n utstellOe. not 01113 as _tertal objeots t bu.t also
because thetr wa7. ot th1Dk1ng are sttll in ex1stenee as W,78

1n 1fhloh peop18 sttll ean thlDk.

This S1.U'V1'V'8l. of tdlought pa....

teme need not be continuous or active in ..od8m lite.

Such

thing. have been ra1 ••d troll the dead. suoh a8 the anclen:t

].an.

guag•• ot Mesopa.tam1a and ~ • .3.S

-All h1sto17 1. oontempor&l7 hl.torr- can be understood
in 8'111 another . . . . .

lot 1n the oN.1Jtary .anse ot the word

whe" oont_pora17 h1.to:ry reten to hlstol'1 ot our re081'1t past
but 1n a .er" striot .ense of oODSo1ou.nesa ot on.-s own acttTlt,
H1SM17 18 not oontained 1n book.

as one aotuall,. pertonaa tt.

or <loCUDl.nils but 11'Ye. as a present tnterest and PlU"Stll t In the
1I1nd ot the hl"tona.n when he ort tlclz.s and interprets 400u-

maniul t testimony, etc., and by so doing re...l1 vee tor hlmselt the
states ot mlnd lnto lfhloh he 1s 1nqulr1ng.36

The ult1mate reason

~t

past actions of hlator.y oan

be present 1s because they can be re-thought.

They al'e present

1n so tar as the,. are the external expression of
)SGolllngwood. M,tol!i9&DW, pp. 96-91.

36 C011t1'lgWood. idM ot

n"g%,%.

p. 202.

thOUt~htl
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AU history 1s conteaporary history. to use Oroeeta
phrase, not because hIsto17 is an "eternal present", but
~oauae the ftp~e8ent· 18 the product of OOD8ciousnes8 at
the level ot thought, Which 1s an actlv1ty capable of
spanning the time-serles. The levels ot oonso1ousness
lllterior to thought have no historJ beoause. as ephemeral
sensation. their identity cannot be re-captured. Reither
my anger 11'1 its lnt t1&l impact nor that of Boaeone else ls
susoeptl ble of !'envall my thought ls. "
!he logloal. conclusion to these reflect10!ls on eT1dence

and the ae_as 1n whioh eV1dtmee makes all hlstorr oontempo_rr

1s that the subJeot-matter ot history is not the past as suoh,
but the past for which we bave eVldenoe.

hob.t the past has

1rrevoeably perished sInce we haTe no documents or other eVidence tor reoonstruetll'lg 1t.

We bellev. on mere test1JJloJ!1 that

the Greeks were great palnters bu.t this bell.t 18 not bl.Mftcal
lmo'Ifledge since. their works haVing pe1i.abed. we ha",e ne
denoe 1Ih1ch wottld g1•• us the opporturdty

or

en-

re-l1v1ng in CUI'

own miDds their artistiC -.xpertenoe.38
Historical evidenoe is o ans t! tu.ted by a t1fo....told eond1 tiol'u the qttestlons the historian Wlshes to ask and the

en-

d..noe (documents. testimony etc,,) that 1s available to him.
"You can't colleot your evidenoe betO" fOU begin thlnking " " •

because th1nk1ng means ask1ng questlons,,"39
It 1s in this area of the use and oonst1 tut10n of ev1 ...

311:. W. F" Toml1n, L, G, 2911i~ (London. Longman. t

G%een • Co., 1953), p. 32.

38cJ0lUegwood. 14M 9f lUlHD't p. 202.

391!dr.4. t p. 210.
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denoe that Collingwood made his greatest oontribut1on toward
distingu1sh1ng the activ1ty of the modern historian from the
pseudo-h1storian.

The d1st1not1on he made 1s between the

sclssors-and-paste hlstor1an and the solentlf1c h1storian.
So1ssors-and-paste history assumes that the funotion of
the historian is to examine sources of h1gh repute and then to
write history as a oorrelation of the best souroes.
we rema1n str10tly obJeotive.

In th1s way

All the histor1an has to do is

f1nd out if the dooument or testimony is true and then he oan
rely on it.
Collingwood has many d1ff1oult1es with this theory.
Acoording to it the essential elements of h1story are memory
and authority.

In order for an event or state of affa1rs to be

known h1storioally, the follow1ng process 1s neoessary.

F1rst,

someone must be acquainted with the event; then he must remember
it and state his reoolleotion of the event 1n terms whioh are
intellig1ble to another; and f1nally this other person must 40cept his statement as true.

A praot1cal defin1tion of this type

of history would be "the belief in someone else when he says
that he remembers someth1ng."

The believer is the h1stor1an;

the person bel1eved 1s called an authority.

Th1s dootrine 1mpl1es that h1storical truth. in so far
as it is available to the h1stor1an. exists in the explioit

ltatements of h1s authorities.

These statements beoome the

sacred text of the historian.

Their value depends on the un-
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brokenness of the tradition they represent.
not tamper with them,
oontradict them.

oha~!.e

Therefore, he may

or add to them, nor in any way

To take it upon himself to regard some state-

ments as pertinent and others as not, to choose some and not
others to make a point, is to appeal to another criter10n beyond
the bare statement of the author1ty.
this theory does not allow him to do.

This is precisely what
What the authorit1es tell

this h1stor1an must be regarded as the truth, the whole aooess1ble truth, and nothing but the truth.
Collingwood repudiates this theory by s1mply stating
that in practioe hlstorians repud1ate the oonsequences of such
a positlon.
author1ties.

Every historlan on occaslon does tamper with his
He seleots from them what he thinks ls important,

ooncludes to statements wh1ch the authorities do not expl1c1tly
make, crit10izes and rejects statements he regards as e1ther
based on mis-information, or en outright 11es, or on bias.

The

historlan does all this without, for the most part, conslder1ng
the philosoph1cal consequences of what he is dOing.4O
Th1s kind of common sense, naive approaoh to historical
knowledge whloh we have been talking about seems to underlie
most faulty Views of historical method, and in its var10us forms
it tries to seduce the unwary from a crit1cal, refleot1ve under-

stand1ng of just what a historian is really dolng.

Collingwood

has described 1n deta1l the historical method wh1ch the histor-

-

40 Ib d., pp. 234-235.

leal seissors-E.nd-paste school must usc, gl veIl their basic

assumptions.
Funda:f'..lentally the sclssors-and-paste historian believes
that he must, by reason of his trade, deal 't'lith ready-made state-

ments which he can acoept as true or reject us false.
fil"St decid.e

upon a. subject to l<lrlte about.

He must

He then starts his

sea.roh for statements by people Hho took part 1n the event or
'!'mo repeat vrhat eyewitnesses told thern.

He lool{s for

tJ.ny

state-

ment by an flinform,ecl source", and after aceumulat1:ng a good
number of them, he excerpts from them and 1noorporates them into
his history.

If these statements contradict ea.ch other, he

must find some way of reconciling them.

He considers critically

the relative trustworthiness of' the sources and decides nh1ch he
is to aocept.

If some statement should relate an event wh1ch he

simply eooUlot believe. he will reject it out of hand.

Though

suoh an approach to history was more common in the past, it has
not completely disappeared even today.
the

sc1ssors~and-paste

histor1an can have only one problem to

settle: i'Thether to aocept or rejeot
QOny

The l{ey point 1s that;

8.

oertain piece of testi-

bear1r~ upon the quest10n in wh1ch he 1s lnterested. 41

The trouble ,,11th so1ssors ...!.md-TJastc history 1s that,
With a totally ine.dequate methodology, 1t concelves of the past
as an object f~t ttlhlch one oan take e. look and. lmx,aediately un-

4t !.l21s!., pp. 257-261.
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p.:lste hls'cor1an looks at a document and finds the meaning r:tlready there, l"ight out there on the paGe 't,1hare Q..n:.vbody can see

ply l'epegts the sts,te·nents that other people ha.ve :'D.9.de and hI')

can get to 1'TOrl{ o.nly lThon he has

,?,

generous supply of read,.v

.:ru).de statements ou the subjects about which he Wishes to think

,,,,un

ill!'1 te. L~2

To combat this solssors-.;lnd-:98ste approaoh
scientific a.ttitude, we ItrllSt reme:nber that

~rl th

hlst,~rians

corne -w1 th a blank ,1l1nclto the ru1.ta but rather

t11 th

a ::lore

d.o not

quostions

about it which deter:alne the course of their 1nvest1gat1on.
Test1:uony becomes j'J,st another source of information for the
~lnSillers

to the!!" questions.
HIstorians must realize that the

DlO;.::;t

imi)Ortnnt queo-

tlon about any str-ite1'lent a:)pearil'l('; 1n h:ts source material 1s
not \'1ilethel" 1t 113 true or

fal~e

but what it means..

To ask what

a statemen't means 1s to transcend the lim!. tatlons of seissor'li~here

and-paste history a.nd to step into a world.

history 1s

more than eopy1:r.t.g out the test1mony of the best sources.
tlfl0 history enables the historian to

slons.

COnl19

"Th1nk1:ng about the stateJllents of.

oal thinking. ,,43

-

42Ibid., p. 274.
43

Ibid.

p. 260.

3clen-

to hls o~m conc1u-

0111"

sources 1s crt ti-

We have here a tundamentall, dirterent attitude toward

authorities anA

testlmo~.

When an historian aocep'.

aft

answer

t.o a questIon asked, given b1m b;r another persou, th1s other

person is often said to be hls Dauth&rt ty· and. the statement
or answer accepted is ca.lled. "te81;1.0n;r".
mort1

the

1.'0 accept the testl-

or an author1 ty as historical truth m.eans the surrendeJ' ot

~e

"hlsto%ian." To aooept testImony backed up b.1

~4enee

1s t on tho othor hand, much IIOre.

The a.f't'1rmat1ol'l or something
'based. on evidenoe 11'3 historical lmow1edge. 44
SC188ora-and-p&ste h1stoJ'7 eeps the h1storian one step

removed. f"rent historical lmowledge.

of

:;;nat thought.

But

History 1s the re-enaotment

to base our historical lmowledge on vaUd

testlmolTJ" or the rella-btll ty of sou.roes is to avoid th1s pnma17

tunotlon .. · I .,. have a dosl" to tind. out it Pythagorea.s 1'_117
proved that the sq_re

ot the hJ'potenuse is

of the square ot the other two sldes.

equal to the sum

I cGUld consult B:tr3

J1W'.Il-

bel' of good. mathematioians or I could even read what l?7thagoreaa

himselt _14.

But the only Wf!I.1

ot monng l1bether a glTen type

of' argument 1s cogent or not 1.s to learn how to argue that -1
and find ou.t.

Me&llWhl1e. it 1. only a seCOl1d best th1ng '" take

the woJld ot those who have done so tor themselves. 4S

Eftn 11'1 the case where 1 am

'fIq'

own witness

and au.thor....

ity 1n t.rru ot a pa8t expe,.-le.ce ot l'lf3' own, reterence to eVi-

dence 1s a'bsolut&ly neoessal')" tor hlstorlcal 'knolTl.edge.

'1

For I

have a tendenoy to combine past tho\1ghts with further de'f"elop.

mente.

Th1s tendenoy oan be cheeked upon 1n only one

-1.

It

:t want to be absolu.tely sure that such a thought was 1n 1ft! I11nd

twenty years ago, I may not me1'8l1 state this, but must haft
evidence ot 1. t •

That ev1denea 1I1.USt be a book, a letter f a note,

a ploture I painted, a reoollection (either rtJ.'1 own or another's)

ot

something I sa1d or did, any of IIhloh might show what

my :tUnd.

Only

w1~h

in

1faS

such evidence before 1'JlY mind. and interpreting

1t without bla.s, can I proye to myselt that I did. think thus

some twent1 years ago. 46
Another quality of the oompetent sclent!!io historian

is one whloh is otten m1stakenl1 called an -historical .ense"
or hi $tartan' S &obil1 tl

'0

the period he 1s studying.

enter into the thought and context

01"

He 1s not saUsf1ed w1 th viewing

h1s sources and evidence as a

~~tnes8

but uses them to get

1~

sld. the evant.

Colllngwood has briefly oontraste4 the Bclssors-andpaste hlsto:r1a.n and the soientific. on.. :
The scs.ssors-and-paate hlstorian reads them (var1ous

k1D48 ot ev1denoe) in a sapi. receptlve aplr1t, 1So find

what they sald. The so1entific historian reads them
11'1. que.tlon 1n hle IIlnd , ha'91.:ng taken the lnltlatlYe
~t

*.

by deol41ng tor himself what he wants to tind. out frOnt them.
~.rt Ule 8olssol"e-arJd-paste hi.torten J'ead8 tIl_ on the

und.eratal'ld1ng ~t; what they 414 not tell h1m in so
words be would ll. . .r tlM out hom. 1m_ at all • • •
II

.

•

~
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scient1fic historian puts them to the torture, twisting a
passage ostensibly about something quite different into
an answer to the question he decided to ask; ~mere the
scissors-and-paste historian said quite confidently "there
is noth1ng in such-and-such an author about such-and-suoh
a subject", the soient1f1c or Baoonian historian will
reply nOh, isn't there? Do you not see that in this passage about a totally different matter it is implied that
the author took such-and-such a view of the sub3ect about
which you say h1s text contains nothing."47
Collingwood has illustrated the procedure that the h1stor1an must follow by draWing an analogy between the detect1ve
and the historian which has won Wide acceptance and use 1n h1stor1cal c1rcles because of its accuracy of descr1pt1on:
A detect1ve 1nvest1gat1ng a case begins by deciding
what he can regard as undisputed fact, in order to build
his theories around that as a framework. If the theories
work out, the framework w1ll be declared to have been
well-founded, and no further questions will be asked about
1t. But if results are not forthcoming, a stage may be
reached at 'tm1ch it is necessal"'1 to go back to the beg1nning
and doubt some of the 1n1tial "facts" of the case. A
detective who, through devotion to the Correspondence
theory of truth, refused to take that step would be vel"'1
little use to his profession, though naturally he would
not be enoouraged to take it till every other expedient
fa1led. The case of the historian is exactly parallel.
He also must be prepared, it necessary, to doubt even his
firmest beliefS -- even, for example, the chronological
framework inside whioh he arranges his results -- thou;rrh'
it does not follow that he will involve himself in such an
upheaval lightly. He will 1ndeed do all he can to avo1d
it, undertaking it only as a last resort, but all the same
he must not rule it out in prino1ple. 4B

47Ib1d., p. 270.

or

~~~!~~ie~ti~~~~~t~a ~s~~iti~;o~l;s ~~~:o~~v: :~ry

the
ogy under the title "Who Killed John Doe?" along with subseqUent development on pages 266-282 of Idea of HistorY_
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One of the main pOints 6ollingwood is trying to make by
the use of this analogy is that an historian, like a detective,
must go beyond the evidenoe presented. not only in a critioal
way, in terms of judging his sources to be
but also in a constructive way.

meani~~ful

or not,

Golng beyond your evldence in

a constructive way means the use of interpolation between statements taken from authorlt.ies and other statements only lmplied
by them.

To take a very simple l1lustration, our authority

may tell us that on Monday Caesar was in Borne and sometime later
in Gaul.

Nothing is said about a trlp, but such an interpola-

tion is made with no doubt about the truth of such a statement.
This act of interpolation whioh the soientific historian
uses has two Significant oharacteristics.
wayan arbitrary or fanciful act.

F1rst, 1t 1s in no

It 1s absolutely necessary.

If we filled up the narrative of Caesar's journey with detalls
about persons he could have met on the way and what he probably
would have sald 1f he met them, the lnterpo1atlon would be arbltrary, the type of "fact" oreated by a good hlstorica1 novellst
who departs from a baslc hlstorioa1 reallty lnto the world of
flctlon.

But the interpolation we are talking about must involve

nothing that is not necessitated by the evldence.

Without this

type of historical oonstruction there would be no h1story at all.
Secondly the type of 1nference used in history is someth1ng 1mag1ned.

If we look out to sea and perceive a ship on

~he horizon, and then. hav1ng gone about our work, ten m1nutes
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later look baoK a0:aln and see it in.

f?,

different place, we f1nd

ourselves automatically 1mag1n.ing 1t as having occupied at sucoessive intervals the areg. covered. when we were not looKing.
Quite the same thing is at work when, using the process of In-

terpole.tlon, we im.agine Caess.r a.s hav1ng traveled front Home to
Gaul when we are told that he was flrst ln one plaoe. then

another. 49
In summary, we can say that evldence is the means by
whioh we are enabled to re-think past thoughts..

The thoughts

of hlstory live in the present in terms of evidence.

'rhis 1s

what is meant 'by the term, "all h1story is contemporary history".
Evidence as suoh has no historioal vs.lue unless by 1t we oan

get at past thought.

IMdence oan be used ln various lrays.

The

seissors-and-paste historlan slmply 1001<$ at his sources, decldes
whether they are true or false and then oorrelates the best of

them in.to a. coherent pioture of the past..

Hls history 1s 11m! ted

to his evidenoe and cannot quest10n or go beyond that eVldence.
The scientific historlan conslders evidence not only in

t10al way but also in a oonstructive way.

f?t

cri-

The oonstruotlve use

of eVidenoe cons1sts 111. lnterpolating implied statements of

sources between those that have been substantially proved, 1n
Order to allO'\oT me to me.ke an lmaglnative (not imaginary) recon-

struotlon of the past.

Like the reconstruction of the detective,

49Ibid., pp. 240-241.
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this p1ctu.re is ve.lld in so far as it ey.pla.ins a<nr't ,1u.stifles
the facts.

The problem of truth in

h1~tory.

The use of evidence, which we

have j11St deseri bed, mises the further question. of truth 1n

Row do we judge what the scient1fic historian d.oes

history.

w1th his evidence 1n

reconstruct1n~

the past to be true or false?

The quest10n here 1s not over the truth of this or that partlcull'i.r faet, but rather sceptic1sm about tfhether we can ever reach
tru.th or state fa.ct preoisely.

If we take up the actiVity of interpolation just descrihe(l above, the queotion

~r1~es

as to how this lmaglnat1.ve

reconstruction of the :?8-st 11hloh I havl':! made 113 verif1ed.
if1cation

d1stl1'l.-~l1i shes

Ver-

m.y reconstruction from sheer fa.nta,sy.

There'l are several a3pects to be verif1ed.
must verify the evidence which I happen to be

First, I

usin~

for my ima-

g1native reeonstruct1on of the past, say, tor example, an eyewitness rolccount to a particular event I am interested In.

I

may ask the questionl Can r put this man'g statements into

~

Coherent picture?

If I c,annl')t J then I hn.ve grounds for ql.les-

t1onln:3: this ~rtleu.lar

SOU1"ee.

Even 1f this man's statements

do ~~ss this test, they must further harmonize with ~y other

eVidence.
Sect)ndly,

r

li'lUst ver1fy the 1. rlferenees wh.1ch

have made from acoepted evidence.

on the lo~!lc

01:-

r

myself

I or someone else may check

soundness of these 1nferenoes 1n terms of their
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relation to the known facts.

However if the historian goes about

his work of inference carefully, there is little danger that his
imaginative reconstructions will resemble those of a novelist
rather than an historian:
The historian's picture of his sUbJect, whether that
s'U.bJect be e sequence of everlts or a ,lJast state of thlng;;;,

thus appears as a web of imaginative construction stretched

bet. . ree:u certa1ll fixed points provided by the sta.tements of
his p.uthorities; and if these pOints are frequent enough
and the threads spun from each to the next are constructed

with due oare, always by the ~ priori imagination and never
by a merely arb! trery fancy, the ":'lhole picture is constantlY' verified by appeal to these data., and runs lit'cle risk
of lOSing touch '\'11 th the real 1 ty ,-rhich 1 t represents. • • •
The hero of a detective novel is thinking exactly like an
historian when, from indioations of the most varied kinds,
he constructs an 1magi~rY picture of how a crime was
cOIllJ'n1tted, and by ,,'hom • ..>O
vJ.tiIllE'~tely

t-:'lO fuctors.

the trLtth of v.y reconstl"Uctlon depends on

'l'he first facto'I' is the evidence

has no meani11g for the hinto:rien urllees 1 t
sent evidence

obllg~s

us

-co

aV"f;~ilable..

l!lee~llS

Hl'ruth

'*wha.t the pro-

believe.· t

The second factor is the histor1o.n functioning a.s an
historiarl~

'l\he: historian must brir.,f!; out of himself the pro";:;lems

whose solut1on he desires to find and he must. CO!wtru.ct the elues
With i'Ihloh he 1s to approach h1s mt.'l.te:'t'lal.

'rhl,s subjective ele-

ment 18 an assent1!?l factor of all histor1cal knOI'1ledge. 51

Any discussion of the problem of truth in history even-

tuaUy reduces i tael! to the most d1fficult element of the

-

50Ib1d.

t

p. 2l1-3.

51Lbld., p. 180.
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probl. . , respect for the judgment aDd autorJ.Ollll' ot the h1storlan

ColltDgwood telt that t1rst ot all a man must learn

hlmself.

to th1nk and Judge historically' by' practice as an historian.
As b1s historical

WOl'k

develops he beeoaes more aware of his

'1111e historiants ant.non at judgJtent 1s something

autonomy.

whioh he brings w1 th him to the study ot the evidence.
sODletb1118 18
~etls1ng

btJue).;t, not

.suaa

solentist

btl, .9.Wl hlstor1an.

or

131

hlstor1oal thought he learns to think h1atol'1oall1.

Experl.-. or bistonoal thlnld.ng provid.es h1s

Judgment

That

aDd 'bbese or! tens. gl"Otl tn

historical knOWledge.

on ter10ZlS

maturl'1 with every

ot

g~

"Hlstol"1 is 1ts own orlte11,on. it

40es not depend tor its val1dl t1 on soa.tbing outsid.e 1 tself' •

It is an au.tonomoWl fol"Bl of thought with its own prl.lplea
and its own metnoda."S2

In gtmeral. histori.ans tail to perealn the momentous
oonseqUG1lOe8 01"

what thel are 4oing.

By expl101 tl,y reeognl zing

wl'lat thq are do1n&t h1storlans could. possibly 'bl"1ng about what

we m1ght oall a Copernican revolution 1n the theory of hlstol'1s
'he discovery that 'he historian does Dot ,.11 on authority

alme!' than hlJuelt to ..oao statenullnta his thought must oontora,
but rather he 18 his own authorit,.

ft. c1ear•• t d ..onstratlcn of the h1stonan'. autol1C1Q'

18 pft'Yld.ed. by bisiiortoal en t1018111.

The b1sto1'1an's au.tonomy
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ls here manlfest ln its most naked form, since it is here eVident that somehow, in virtue of his actiVity as an historian,
he has power to reject something explicitly told him by his
authorities and to substitute a conclusion of his own.

If that

is possible, the oriter1on of historical truth oannot be the
fact that a statement is made by an authority.

Bather It 1s the

truthfulness and the 1nformat1on of the authority that are in
quest1on; and this question is one the historian must answer
for himself, on his own authority.53
When the historian re-thinks a past thought, it is at
this moment that he passes judgment on the truth or falsity of
history.

vfuen the historian re-enaots past thought in the con-

text of his own knowledge, he, at the same time, criticlzes it,
forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors
he can discern ln It.

This oritioism of the thought whose hls-

tory he traces is not secondary to tracing the history of it.
It is an indispensable condition of the historical knowledge
1tself.

Nothing could be more misunderstood concerning the

h1story of thought than to suppose that the historian as such
merely ascertains what someone in the past has thought, leaving
it to someone else to deCide whether what this person in the
past thought

t~S

true or not.

"All thinking 1s critical think-

ing: the thought whioh re-enaots past thoughts, therefore,
53Ib1d •• pp. 236-238.

criticizes them 1n re-enacting them."5 4
As early as 1925 Collingwood denied that 1nsistenoe on
the

autono~y

of the histor1an would mean a oommitment to sub-

jectIVism and historical scepticism.

The denial implies the

ablli ty to judge the historian and his 11Tork from a higher Viewpoint:
Each hIstorIan sees history from his OtTn oenter, at
an angle of his Olqn; and therefore he sees some problems
which no other sees, and sees every problem from a point
of View, and therefore under an aspeot, peouliar to himself. No one historian, therefore can see more than one
aspect of the truth; and even an infin1ty of historians
must always leave an Infln1 ty of aspeots unseen. Historical study is therefore inexhaustible; even the study of
a quIte small h1storical field must neoessarily take new
shape in the hands of every new student.
'rbIs, we may observe, 1s not subjective idealism, unless it is subjective ideal1sm to maintain that a hundred
people lOOking at the same tree all see different aspeots
of it, eaoh seeing something h1dden from the rest. The
more their perception 1s an intelligent perception, impregnated with thought t the more nearly true it will be to
say that each sees what the others see, and that all see
not merely an apparent tree but the real tree; but they
can never detach themselves from the distinot startingpoints at lmioh they took up the prooess of peroe1vl~~.55
The histor1an even establishes the "facts" of history.
For 1'1hat modern h1storians have realized is that historical
facts are not "given" to the historians but must be established
by them.

In history, the word "fact" does not have the oommon

sense meaning lire are familiar with.

-

The faot that in the second

54rbld., pp. 215-216.
55Co111ngwood, l\r1stote1ian Soc1etI.Prooeed1~~s, p. 172.
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aenturJ the leGions heean to be recruited '!'lholly outside Italy

1s not somethinG: immediately given.

The fnct 1s arr:\..,ved at

only inferentially by a process of intE!!"pretlng datA according
to a complicF.',tecl system of historical l"l.lles and assumptions. 56
'("tle objecti"le truth of history 1s alufl,ys open to further

modiflea.t1on depending on the ability of some fUture historian
and the acqu1s1 t10n of new date..

tal ned , but may be
hlstorl~~s

No fe,ct is ever l-fholly aseer-

prog~ess1vely ascert~1ned;

as the labor of

goes forward, they know more and more about the facts,

and reject with greater and greater confidence a number of mis.
talcen accounts of them.

But no h1stoncal statement ever ex-

presses the complete truth about B,n;'! s1nr;lf9 f.?et. 51
The ultl!lkq,te

!~oa.l

,of h!stQU 1s hl:!r'1!W seJ,.f- 1sn.q.i>lledr;e.

question. which Colllne;wood

i'JaS

In the L'i.st analysis,

1s h1story for?

'tm::~,t

The last

to ask hlmeelt eJJout history 't'ITas:
'rh1s is not a. ques-

tion 9.bout the object or goal of historical inquiry. bttt mther

about the

PQ~pose

or goal of. historical

think1~x

as such.

The answer proposed 1s that history 1s the very life of

our m1nd "lfhich 1s not mind except so fa.r a.s it both lives 1n
historical process and 'knows i taclf as so 1ivinp:;. ,158
history 1s "for" hwnan self-knowledge.

Therefore

It is generally thought

to be of lm~ortance that man know hi~salf.

We me~n here not Just

-----------._.
-~,-,~-.------------------------.--------------~-------56
Collingwood, Id.ea of

H1~rt?0itl,

p .. 133.

~~CollingWOOd, Aristotel1an society Prooeedings. p. 160.
Coll1 fi'wood Idea of Illato

Immti.ng his merely persoool pecu11ar1 t1es, the th1ngs tha.t d1stirlf0uish h1m from other men, but h1s nature as

r:ta.n.

IIfirst, what it 1s to be c. man; secondly,

knmd.ng

This meo.ns

Imo~ring

'\..;Jnc.t

:1. t 1s to be the kind of man you are; and thlrdl.y, l\l'lOlr1ng what

it 1s to be the man YOU are and nobody else 1s.,,59
~mo"n:ng

It means

what you can do; and because no one knows 'tmat he can do

unt11 he tries, the only clue to ~l'hat man ca.n do 1s """hat man

The value of h1story 1s that 1 t tocches us toThat man

has done..

is by showing us

~~t

he has done.

/11h18 same not1on

is re-stated

the goal of h1storioal inqu1ry, the
If

by

Collingwood in terJls of

re-th1nl~ng

the h1storian knows by a process of

~mat

thoughts, 1t
he lmo'VlS

l~'hat

t'ollo~qs

of past thoughts.

rs-thinkl~~

1s past

that, in knoll'li:ng 'irlhat somebody else thought,

he hlulself is able to t111nk.

Finding out what he

is able to do is finding out what l<ind of man he is.

If he is

able to Ullderstand the thoughts of a great many different people,

it follows that he must be a great many different k1nds of man.
"He must be, in fact, a microoosm of all the history he can
know.

Thus his

o~r.n

self-knowledge is at the same time his

kno\~ledge of the world of human affairs • .,60
~mn

is the product of h1s past.

History

upon man an eye for his situation in the present.

-

59!E~£.., p. 10.
60COlllngwood, Autob!or.raphy, pp. 114-115.

can bestow
It can provide
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an exact knowledge ot the l"flJ:lge of po.st responses to a. p1"Otuse
ve.riet1

ot

81 tua.tlon.~ and. thus provlde him with an intelligent

guIde to the detem1Mtlon of the k1nd ot

mall

he will make hlm-

self to bel
The bod7 of human thought or mental acti v1 ty 1$ It
oorpo-.'. posse••lon, aM alaO" aU the ope.tlou

.

lmleh our tdnds PfJ:rtorm are operatlons whlch wCfl.eal"llGd
'0 perto. 0.. othe". who bave pertoNed thea. alrea(Q'.
Sinoe J1l1nd 1s what it does, and hu.ma.n nature, 1'1 1t ls a
Mae to'11 anrth111.1 ~, 18 on1,. a -.me tor hu.an ao:t.1'd.tles.
this acquisition ot abll1t,y to perform determinate operatlou 18 the aequ1s1'1011 0'1 a
h..... natu.ft.
'l'hue the historical prooess 1s a proC8S8 1n 1dUch marl
c",,'.. tor MueU thls or that ld.tld ot huur1 nat'tlN b1
~creat1.~ in his own thoU{;bt the past to which he is
h.lr. B7 his"oneal thln'k1DC, the and whose selfknowledge 1s hlstory't not only d1seovem w1 thin 1 taelf
'bose powers of Wbleh b1storioal thoacbt reveals the posession, but actually develops thosel'owers ~ a latent'l

'.teal_".

to an aetual staM. 'bS1.ngs them
PO1/:

aDd 18 what

lr.~o

OOW. . .oo4. buman natu.J!'e
41.~1ttplShe.

_

18

etteotlve .neteltGe.

hlatorlcal aot1V1ty

troa all othU' be1ngs.

"The 1d_

that mati, ..~ tl'OJl hla selt-oo.o1ous hlstor1oal Ute 18 41t-

terent hom the rest of

.~'1on

1Jl being, a za,:tlorta1 an'Ml,

18 a are ftPd'S't1tlon.,,62
fb1a .oapl....
though...

Col.U~·s

analya1s ot h1storloa1

ae has __s.d..red. the object of Mstorr t put Im-.n

aotlO1l8. ata4 re-det1l'le4 it 1n te. . of the posslb1Uty of laloWt.Bg 1t.

"'17. by re-tblnk1q the past tJhoupta of h1storloal.
i4M
62;tb1!l.f p. 221.
61CoUlngwOOd,

qt lIill9D:.

p. 226.

persons manifested in exterior actions.

Since the re-thinking of

past thoughts is still part of the goal of histor1cal inquiry,
he further explained the use of eVidence, by wh1ch the past 1s
made present.

Ev1dence 1s the means to our goal.

It 1s by put-

t1ng evidence to the torture, by using 1t as a point of 1nference
and by us1ng it to judge my imaginatIve reconstructions of the
past that I am ultimately able to re-think past thoughts, and
in the process of re-thlnking them, judge them.

By

carryin~

on hlstorlcal thlnklng, I acquire self-knowledge In terms of the
poss1bl1lties and 11mitatlons of man (and therefore myself) as
manifest In hIstory.
A

final detln!tlon of histor,v_

As Collln.,cr,wood analyzed it, we

could fInally defIne history as "a sclence or an answering of ques
t1ona; concernIng

h~man

aotlons In the past; pursued by interpre-

tatlon of evidence; for the sake of human self-knowledge. n63
The four major characterIstIcs of hlstory are that It Is:
(a) solentlflc, or begIns by aSking questlons, whereas the
wrlter of legends begIns by knowlng somethIng and tells what
he knows; (b) humanistIc, or asks quest10ns about things done
by men at determinate tImes in the past; (c) ratIonal, or
bases the answers whlch It ~Ives to Its questIon on grounds,
namely appeal to eVidence; (d) self-revelatory, or exists In
order to tell man what man 1s by telling what man has done.64

Hav1ng completed our Investigatlon of Collingwood's phIlOSOphy of hIstory, it remains for us In the next chapter to trace

briefly Its relationship to the other branches of philosophy.

-

63IbId., p. 11.

.....

64Ibld., p. 18 •

CHAPTER III
COLLING',';OOD'S CONCEPTION OF frHE HELI\TION

OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY
r~rpose

of

~pter.

As we have seen, Collingwood was both a dis-

tinguished historian and a g1fted philosopher.

In h1s works he

covered many of the ohief areas of knowledge: history and archaeology, the philosophy of art, cosmology and the ph1losophy of
scienoe, the ph1losophy of h1story, philosophical method, and

even reoent polItIcs.
a

But diverse as his aotivity was. it had

clearly marked unity which he indicated in his Autoblograpb3.

UMy

life's l'1ork hitherto, as seen from my fIftieth year, has been

in the main an attempt to br1ng about a rapprochement between
philosophy and history. til

This goal

1'¥""aS

set by Collingwood be-

oause as both philosopher and histor1an, he saw that philosophers
did not recognize the value and l'l'orth of historIcal kno'tlledge.

This chapter will be attempting what
proposed but never formally did.

aollino~ood

himself

Collingwood worked out, in the

Idea of HistoI1, a philosophy ot history, an inquiry into the
nature of historical knowledge.

But he lett undone the work of'

relating that inquiry to the other departments of ph1losophy

-

lCol11ngwood, ~~tobior.raphy, p. 77.
70
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and to other stud1es and aot1v1t1es.

The goal of th1s chapter

1s to make exp11c1t the relat1onsh1p of ph1losophy and h1story
as seen 1n

Coll1nc~ood' s

t.:rorks.

:~hen

t'1S understand h1s ult1mate

concept1on of th1s relat1onship, we w1ll understand why any
further inquiry 1nto the relat1onsh1p of philosophy of h1story
to other

de~~rtments

of knowledge was cons1dered unnecessary.

Early posht1on; Specubum Mentls.2

This work of Col11ngwood,

written in 1924, is basically an epistemological 1nquiry.

He

described 1t himself as Us. cr1t1cal reViel'l of the chief forms
of hu.-nan exper1ence. nJ

Therefore the work is 1nvolved w1th the

d1fferent forms of knowledge wh10h correspond to the different
forms of human experience.

'rbe investigation begins with three

baSic assumptions: f1rst, that the five basio forms of huma.n
experience which man has discovered are art, rel1gion, SCience,
history, and philosophy; seoondly, that these forms are experienced not as mere abstraotions but as a concrete form of experience in which the whole person is engaged; thirdly, that because each 1s a ooncrete form of experience, there is 1n some
sense a k1nd of knowledge, a specif1c aotiVity of the oognitive
faculty, involved in eaoh exper1ence.

[t
r

Having made these assumptions. t'J'e can then state the
2R• G. Collingwood, Specylum Ment1s (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1924).
3Ib1d., p. 9 ..

ll:rb~d.

t

p. 39.
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question or problem that Collingwood hoped to solve.

We have

five forms of knowledge and eaoh olaims to give us the truth
about the nature of reali ty.

Does one or the other form of

knowledge g1ve us the whole and absolute truth about rea11ty
or do they all share in truth?

If they share 1n giving us the

truth, does any one form g1ve us more truth than any other?
To answer these questions, we must oonstruot a test of
the true form of knowledge.

The test 1s that of self-consistency

This test is applled by us1ng each form of cogn1t1on, by th1nking
histor1cally, ph1losophically, or re11g1ously and then

show1~~

the necessary 1noons1stenoy ot the form being or1ticized.

The

thinker must show the form of knowledge demolishing itself
through the working of 1ts own inconsistencies.

This prooedure

led 6ol1ingwood to work out what he oalled his "map of lm.owledge"
on which the various forms of knowledge are shown to be related
1n a hierarchical relationship.

His map of knowledge

is to be a statement of the essential nature or structure
of each sucoessive form of experience, based on actual
knowledge of that form from within, and concentrated upon
the search for inconsistencies t rifts l1hich lfhen we come
to put a strain on the fabric will Widen and deepen and
ultimately destroy it.5
Ihe map of knowledgfh

The life of reason is found first to

develop in the aesthetic consciousness.

most elementary form of

5Ib1d., p. 46.

knowle~~e.

Art is the f1rst and

It 1s pr1marily oonoerned
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with the use of imaginat1on, and as such 1s not concerned w1th
the truth or fals1ty of things.
its object.

It does not assert reality of

But 1t can and does express in its various forms,

profound and ultimate truth and yet because at the same t1me it
functions primarily in the imaginat1on, it provides no means, in
1tself, for judging the merits of this or that part1cular work.
To overcome this taiblre, to be able to Judge truth, we
must introduce a logical element into it.

There must be an

assertion, without full reflection, that what is essentially
Imaginative is true.

This is religion in its most prim1tive

form as 1t spr1ngs from the error 1n art.
matic assert10n of truth, of realIty.
knowledge because it claims to be true.
it refuses to argue.

Re11gion 1s the

do~-

It 1s a fuller form of
It is dogmatIc because

Re11g1on is st1ll artistio in tl'l&t it is

essentially imagI1lative and is interested in the pursuit of
beauty, but is more like full knowledge of realIty because it 1s
1nterested in the beauty of oonduct and revealed truth.

The

main error In religious thought is th1s: it fails to assert
the d1st1nction between 1ts mytholog1cal symbols and what is
symbolized.

'rhis problem is illustrated when we teach the ohild

about God the Father.
up there in heaven."

We say "God is your Father and He dwells
If we told the child, "Well God is not

reall, your father and He really doesn't live in the sky," if
We

-

separated the meaning of God from the words used to symbolize

Hl., there would be no 1ntelligibility left of God for the child.
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Therefore, the knowledge of God must grow on this imaginatlve
scaffold 't'There symbol and what Is symbollzed 1s left undlstlnguished.

This Is the baslc error of rellg1on.
Science overcomes this error by the use of abstractlon

wh1ch enables it to d1 vorce the symbol from \-lhat 1 s symbol! zed.
The use of abstraction, In effect, tends to split reallty into
two parts; the mlnd or thought and the external world.
abstract symbolism of sclence becomes mathematics.
to a new dlfflculty and error of thought.
from unproved assertlons, views the world

Th,.s leads

l~thematics,

SL~ sp~cle

which leads to a materialistic viel': of all realIty.

The new

startlng

quant!tatls
'llhe abstract

symbolIsm of science tends to be glven an existence of Its own
and

1s imposed on the world.
This error Is, in turn, corrected to some degree by his-

tory.

Hlstory, in the practice of hlstorical method, realizes

that the abstract must always rest upon the concrete, that the
f'oundation of all speculatIon 1s the concrete fact.

However

the historian does not altogether esct;),j)e the tyranny of abstraction, for he still retains 'ehe notlon of the separation of
h1s mind and thoughts from the world.

Rea.lity is regarded as

to himself.

H;;: looks at hlstor',f as

SO!lleth:ln~~::

":'rholly

someth1~

wholly outs1de himself.I'here 113, therefore, the need

of philosophic

e.x:t~rnf~l

thinking to overOOr4Et th1s final contradictlon and

error of lm"i,rl edp:e •
i)hllosophy is the process of br1dg1n..a: the separation

'15
bet'L'1ean subjeot and object.

torian who

re~11ze8

i\.

philosopher rea.lly is an his-

he is part of the process he 1s

studyil~.

He converts historical thinkine into self-}mowled,[:.:;s.

Basically,

philosophy is refleotion on all forms of Imol11edge, realizing
'chat no one form of e1:perience 1s all experience and never se-

para'c1ng the knOtfer and. the act of
\;e have gi-ve:!l this briet'

}:::l'lOl!J'il'lg

SU1Dl:ll8.ry

from the thing knm·m.

of S"peculum Mentis in

order to illustrate Goll1ll!'!,wood' s early views on the relation of
and philosophy.

hlsto~J

t;ion~3hip

Yhat

~ln

we now say about th1s rela-

as it is viewed by 6oll1nglfood 1n 1924'(

?irst,. ":"'e should note that philosophy and h1stor;y,.
though closely related, are considered to be distinct.
tho~~h

not the whole of the

;~arde(l

as the highest fortl'l, more fret) from error than any other.

F'hilo:~ophy

£~owledge

History,

of reality, is still re-

is above all forms of knot'11edge and a distinctly

different operation of the mind.

For it reflects on all other

forms of knm'fing and integrates them into a full picture of
real 1 ty.

Philosophy is formal self-knol-iledge, the ultlmate end

of all operations of knol'T1ng.6
Though dlstinot, phllosophy and hlstory are olosely

relate,] for philosophy 1s only one brief step beyond historica.l
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knOWledge.?

B.r rerlection philosophy lntegrates the knower

and

the thing known and helps the lmoWer to know himself as part ot

the tote.l reality knQl'm.

Th1s 1s Just one brier step beyond

historical. knowledge wh10h oonslders h1sto17 as knowledge ot an
objectlve world and does not oons1der the h1storian himself as

part ot the precess.
Seeondl.1, we mAl observe that. Collingwood considers the
.ethod ot phllosoph7 to be h1stoneal.

Thls can be observed

in his verr 48fti'd. t10n ot a phtlC)sopher as ffan htstol1.an who
rea11zes he 1s part ot the process he i8 stu4T1ng. ,,8

Th1:rd1,. it we examine the prooedure used in this book,

we see a further indication ot the identitioation ot progress
in knowledge 111 th historical P1'Og2'ess.

In the development of

Collingwood's theme, the aesthetic mode ot knowing oorresponds
w1 th the pr.lmi t1ve ages ot man, the religious

tOft

ot knowledge

wlththe :rise of Chr1stlantty and the Middle Ages. the soientitic mode of' Jmow1ng nth the rlse ot eolence 1ft modern t1mes.
al'1d the hlstoncal mode ot knOw1J1g w1 th the short jWllP to phil-

osoph,. as the ultimate development of mlnd, to be popUlarized
by Coll1ngwood huselt.

We s •• , then. tbat ColllDgWOod at a

7~•• p. 246. "1'bough, 1ra the t1"Ul81tio1"l fl"Oll bistory to plif1Oaopby, hlstory ..s such 1s dest1"07ed. the trans! tlon
ls 80 briet and. so t.ne'f'1table 1tlA, DGh belODging to the historical trait. of 111m. is taken over almost 'tll1CI1aDged by the philosophical.·

8.l:2lA., p. 246.
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very earl,. age 1n his development regarded both history and.
phl1osoph1 very highly t rut had not yet tully reflected upon
and artioulated their relationshlp ,fi th 1 ts implloations.

29UlpgrogAt@ "§eepgt ;pl!tau".

tea.u" in Coll1ngwood's

What

deve~opment.

lfe

call the "second pl....

refers to three ot his works.

OOllPose4, tOl:' the most part. between 19.33 and 1936=

Dllq'Gb1UJr M!libod (19'3); btl.
Ul§lim (1936).

0t !miNiS

IBm 2D

(19,4); 14M

0'

Professor '1'. M. Itnox has oalled these works the

most sucoes$tul attempt ot Collingwood 11'1 br1Dglng abQut his

lA'PS.P9b.Nw
EMu:

98

of phllosophy and. history. 9

!1l&10EJ?M.,. Meth94 U;.9JJl.

Professor Knox has 4e... ~

SQr1be<l this book as a. "philosophio landrllark" beaause it both.

argued tor and gave exatllples of mants lntertu.a1on of philosophical and nlstol'1eal th1nk1ng.10

In this book Collingwood. argued

that the sub3eot matter ot philosophY' r$sembles hlstol"'1 rather

than :nature and therefore ph11osopMca.\ _thad must be oonatmcted aooord.1J)gl,..

1J:'h1$ does not mean that lolllllgWOod

no1f.

ident1t1es h1stor1 and phl1osoph7 because he tblniS that they
have identlcal. meth()d.s.

That he did not th1nk this

'ft&.'I

oan

be shown.

90olUngwood,

XXIX

Ia.Me

9'

10ttR. G. CoUlrtgWOOd".
t
p. 411.

(194~)

ltls'm.

pp. nl-Vill.

lJ:9fe.t4lua et

='1. t\9A.4!1lY,
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olear that theories of scienoe or of history, refleotions on
their methods, are not parts of soience or history but rather
of Philosophy.ll

Suoh formulations would oome as a result of

an ep1stemological invest1gation.
That historical and philosophical method are not identical is evident from the fact that as thought, philosophy is
actually more like soience in that 1t 1s concerned w1th the universal, not the conerete partioular.

It is concerned with truth

as such, or the universal principles of art or historical method.
This universality is seen in the very subject matter of philosophy which 1s being oonsidered as one, true, a.nd good.

Being,

as good, would manifest itself in various forms of goodness on
a scale of forms running from the lower to the higher form.
These seales of forms of goodness or un1ty eto. are so related
that the higher good or unity is not only better or more unif1ed
than the lower but also inoludes it. 12
from both

l~t

Therefore it is clear

the philosopher is doing and the subjeot he deals

With that history and philosophy are not 1dentified.
But as in his previous work, Collingwood saw very important conneotions between the two disoip11nes.

In th1s par-

ticular book, Collingwood emphas1zes two of these connect1ons.

-

llR. G. Collingwood, Essay on Ph~bosoph1cab Method (Ox-

fOrd: Clarendon Press, 1933, pp. 1-2.
12Ib1:d., p. 88.
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First of a.ll, let us consider that philosophy deals
with being.

But being is only found by reflection on experience.

This experience is of a special kind, not
but the experience of one ~mo thinks. i )

perce~tual

experience

Now a philcsoph~r who

reflects on some speoia1 field of' knol'Tledge such as poll tics or
natural science is not himself a natural sc1entist or polltician.
Therefore in so f'ar as he does think scientif1cally or politically, his knowledge is largely histOrical; a re-thinking of
the thoughts of other men. 14 We can say that the experiential
bas1s for the study of being 1nvo1ves historioal thOUght.
The second relation between history and ph11osophy is
that

a

h1story of ph1losophy and m.y

ought to largely co1no1de.

oltm

ph1losophical system

For each new ph1losophic system be-

g1ns where its predecessors left off, and thus in essenoe, sums
up the previous history of philosophy.
A new philosophio system is necessitated because a previous one has been found in error in so far as the old system
has not identIfied or solved all the problems to which its existenoe gave rise or to wh1ch further philosophioal thinking will
gIVe 1'1se.

Nonetheless, the old system was a step forward in

so far as it solved the problems at hand that it was meant to

-
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solve.

is
A f;).rther concltwlm'l follo'tdng from the above conceptIon

of philosophy in h1storical ovolutlon is tha.t higher forms of
philosophy are de1relopcd. latar in time than the It>l'rer.
is the lOiter i'orms of philosophy that set

the higher <,nes solve.

11p

l1'or it

the problems that

TJe should. be carefu.1 not to concludtl

from this that a sImple narrative of which philosophIcal system

happened to 1'01101'1 the other is the sar:1e u.s a. cr1 tl02.l account
of which philosophical systeIlls are genuine developrnents in philosophical thinking..

This abIl1ty to erltlcl!!:e in terms of a.

tl"'Lte or false system 1s l'J'hat stlll enables
tin~u1sh

ColJ.l~10od

to dls-

historical a.nd philosoph1eal thinJdng 11"1 this area.
'!'he dlstlnctl(,n

bet~'leen

hlstory and a crt tlca.l philo-

sophic system 1s maintained. even though CollIngwood !!oes much
further in relating them than 110St of hls contemporaries 'rflould

have.

He be11eve<1 tha.t t}ne philosoph1c system could. oertalnly

be ne~,rer the truth than another. 16
valid ;:).nd pertInent to

true.

i:l81c

t1hioh. of

He be11eved it was both
t't10

phl1oso:phlc systems 1s

And to ask "Is this or that systerl true

PhilosophIcal, not an historical qu.estion.

2t false?" 1s a

Philosophy is "a

distinct and 11 ving form of thout~ht t" not "an appen.~)e of.

15Col11ng'Wootl, Essay on Philosoph1cal Method, pp. 190-191.
16Ibid.

t

p. 1 8 9.
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natural science or a part of history."l?

IeLae of Elcto:r,y (1936).
l:1~»inti20!n 21.

In this bool{t

Coll1ns~rood contimtc~

d1stll"lct1cm bf:t"l'Teen. htstory ,s.nd :phl1o/:,;ophy.

to

The

philosopher oa.l1 consld.er the poetic relation between tbe h.istoria.n and his obJoct of

tweetl

th()tl€~ht

knoVilecl:,~e..

Collingwood (Ustlngu.lsher; be-

[tbout the pa.st (hi story) €:.l'ld the lJl'ID.reness of and.

reflectj.on uIJon the thollCht process In''l'olvea in hlstor1ca.l thlnkil1.;~;

(philosophy of hlntory)..

these
up the

:rart~.culn:r

concIusiol1s.

inve~:rt1g[o\tlC)n

:r11e

But

hlsto:t"1Ln of rtt1tronotlY, for

thJ~

ph1J.onm:>hcr l'loU.ld

ta.l~e

of the truth of these conclusions t?nd. the

sou.ndness of the m€'thotis of In"tj(9st1crn.t1on in this I)D,rtlcule..r

sclence.
pe.st

The obJ€',ot of the h18torian is to dlscovf)!"

r~cti(')ns.

~nd

expla.in

If he takes the further step of reflecting upon

historical method and ctet;el'IJli]:ung ,;,i1.at mcth.)d oueht; to be uocd.
by [:t11 (~ootl histo:ria.no J he becomes

:3.

Philosopher. 1S

In his stud.y of h.1stor-J, Colli:'lt-"!-'%l'f)OO still affll"1ned

that there 1s such a thine as trJth, undcrGtood as a reality

-------------------------------------------------------------~~
1""(Il?1:9:., p.

S.

l8:~oll\ng1·100.1, Idea of HistorY, p. xviii; pp. 3- LJ..

82
a man todlq' to judge an historical action
or evl1.19

a8

ftght

O~

wrong, good

To pass judgment on hlstor1cal action 1n this waY' 1s

Bot tho main tunotlon of the hlsuo:t'1an and. 1 t has tN.d1 t10nally
been the objeet of' stu~ by the ph1losopher.

A philosopher 'hen,

aoooNing to ~()111ngwood' s pri.!lClples, is able to go be70nd the

work ot the historian beoallse he can lnv&stlgate faotors 1n hu-

man Ute wtt5.oh transoend the partloul.ar1 ties of

a:t'q

histor1cal

pe:r1od.

Id!l ~ ~

'J.2'l4).

*1'h1s book shows how philosophical tlttestlo111

can be 111tm11mted and solved 1'1 an historloal approach.

When

Cbl11~

~

. .s1n the pl'Oeesa of pttbllsh1ng the

,opbJ.Q€11 l!1;h9,4,

he

Nma~ked

to

So

"'If

9J1

Mend that he intended to appl1

the ph.11csopMoal ttt4)thod evolved 11'1 that book to a. problem which
bad. never been solved, that ls, to the ph11osophy' of' na.tuft. 20
Tb1s book, th.", proceedS With an J'd.stortoa1 !U)8.lysls

of' past thought on nature, d1v.1dlftg the development ot cosmology
(the "1s.tlou of selence and philosophy') into three penods.
Part I ccm.siste4 in the Gre.k oo.SJlology as

lanlana.

J?yt~.

and Arls1;otle,

~

ex_purled 'b7 the
II gives the Bena1$-·

sanee view of nature; pa.X"t IU, the medetn Vlew.
Acooftlng to the pMlosophlcal m.iQhod elaborated

bJ

eollll2gWOOd, what ._ to follow was h1. own Tl. . of eo_log.

19Irl.14. t Pit 225_

tOa. G. Oo111Dgtt'Oed, lAM tt

Pna. t 1945), p. v.

-,tan

(OxroMI cna:ren4021

havinR

the

pre~ared

~round

oonsiderations on nature.

for it by a

thorou~h

analysis of past

T .. M. Knox assures us that "from

·\u.~st

1933 to Sentember 19;4 he was workin?, intensively at this subJeot, studyiror, the history of both natural soienoe B.nd cosrnoll)gloa1 speculation, anrl. elaboratlnp: a oosmology of his own. ,,21
However the

cos'D.o1o~

in 19,;, presented in leotures
19"3'7 was dropped

duri~

of Col1inp.:wood which was developed,
~lven durin~

19;4 and

a~aln

in

a drastio reVision of' his notes while pre-

parln,q: them tor pubiioatil')n in Se1Jtember of 19.,9.

At thi.s tj.me

a shl')rt note or oonclusion was substituted for the desoription

of his own oosmolopical

The note was

s~stem.

both a warn1nR and a question.
toriOA.lI!:1UmJ·''\~!';'r

a be(l'innlnr:.

of

truth.

A warnIng thAt the

thon~ht 9,bout

r~aoherl.

Thl:; ouestton :raised

this: l{here do we

~o f~om

b~

WA

of an his-

there 1s no indication that

any oonelusions 1n a.bsolute

hls

hlator1~A.l

stu.dy

wa~

simply

here?

Coll:tnr"Woon then takes it upon himself to
direction in which

en~

to be

nature is not a eonclnsion but

H'.stol'"1cal1~r sp~ald.rnr,

thoU,f'ht about M.ture had.

oonsld~red

shnul<t pdvo,nee.

natu.ral se1enee is not, a.s mod.em

sllP.'~est

the

W.c, must reAlize that

~(')sj.tlvtstR

have thought, the

only department of hUT\'W,n thoup:ht wh1.oh indulges 1n a. froi tf'u.t

Search for truth.

Moreover, it is not even a selt-contained and

aelf-sufficient form or thought, but depe.nds for lts existence

-

U

-......

N

21T. M. Knox, IiEditorts Preface," in Collingwood, Idea

ature, p. v.
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on some other distinct and irreducible thought form.
se~.rohin!~

Further

must determ1ne what this thought form 1s and then take

1 t 1nto considerat1on 1n try1ntr, to determine what nature 1s.
Th1s other
nature is history.

thou~ht

form which grounds

thln~1ng

about

TherA follows an account of the sim1larities

between natural science and history.

There are

seientifi~

facts

which are events in the world of nature1ust as there are h1storical facts in the world of human activity.

There is a process

of verif1cat1on of facts similar to histor1cal verification.

O~

servat10ns about facts of nature must be recorded and 1nterpreted

as in h1story.

Thus sc1entific facts are a

cla~s

of h1storical

facts and no one can understand 'C!lhat a scient1fic fact is u.nless
he understands enough about the theory of history to

l~ow

what

an historical fact is.
This can be said about theory.

Soientific theory rests

on certain historioal facts and 1s verified or disproved by other
historical facts.

Any investip;a.tion of past theories and their

subsequent interpretation involves

lIS

in historical resea.roh:

I conolude that natural science as a form of thou~ht
exists and always has existed in a context of history, and
depends on historical thought for its existence. From this
I venture to i:nftu" that no one can underst.&.nd natw:-a.l
science unless he understands history: and that no one can
anstJer the question lfhat nature is unless he knows what
hi8t.,~ ts~
Th1s is a 'luestl",n 'Which 'I..lexan1er nnd 'fuitehea.d hrnre not asked.. And that is why I answer the q1.test1on,
tl~'!h"'rl"\
t'ir
...
"",.
"-40;"';

H'e
u.

"'0 1"1"01>'1
... .,...."'<>~,
...............\..,j,.""~"'_"
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of nature to the idea of hlstory."22

----------------------------------------------------------------

8S

We can note here a. transltlon in the th..ught of Colllagwood

phy.
fON

about hi_ 00l1o,ept10n ot the relation .t b1stor.y and PhilosoThe

811"re.81011 ot h18 OWD persORal o,oaaolOQ

1fb1oh was

1m. oonoluslo1'1 to tbe hlstoneal .twiT .e tind. 1n the

to

14M

9( IUU:t ll'J4t.eate. a. break wlth hie pHYloWl clear posltlon on
th1s relatloulUp.

He nbeiJJ.""'. tor. penona1 00_01017 a

oonoluslol1 'eslgned to r.rtber helght.8 Ibe .a1ue and posltl08
ot hisw". 111 hlll8Al'l t1'101&«1'1t.,

H1story 18

now a •••ned. to

be not

0JJl7 of ftl,.e 1n 1 helt a. an aut.8011011. b!UlOh ot knowledge,
alao to be at the Tery root of 8c18ntlt10 thought.

but

lH.stol'7 has

now been read1e4 to so".a 1. aDd sol",e.., ot Coll.1Dgtr004 t • philoaophloal. probl_ 111 a

"'.1" mo" 1'64ioa1 than ht had ever pre-

'9'1--17 IN8seate4.
'!'hI Ca.. . NRJ:tOIlMtp1;. In ColUDgWOocl'a 1....' wrltlnga, 6ub:
biocJ.'!Qhl (1939) Ul4 11m .1.MIID'ld.!, (1939). we ha",e lUs
tlMl a"8r h tbe ,uesUon P"poNd at the beg1tm1ng ot thls
ohapter, reprcU.ng the relation of 111s"'17 to other s'W41e. aDd
actlVitl •• , and

ItO" ~1oul.ar11 to ph11osopb.J'.

In

i;he.8

worlaJ

Collingwood advocate. the v1ew that all lmo1fle4ge (1nolu41Dg .01eD:'1t10 knowledge 11'1 the

DAftOW

senae) has an h1stol"1oa1 basis.

UtltortuJ:rate11 Collingwood talls lnto gross historlel.. and the

....

erro~

ot whlOb he was oonstantly acousing the posltiV1sts.

For hi. exolusive rellance on historr as the oni,. val14 form ot
knoWledge is the exaot oounterpart ot the positinst rellance
OIl

nat'11ftJ. 801enoe and. sclent1rl0 lc:nowledge.

Our examlnation of
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Collingwood's thoUght in these books, will shot'J' that he fosters
in his own thought the irrationalism and sceptioism of wh10h he
accused all

~~o

did not accept history as true knowledge.

For

Collingwood excluded from his own system any inquiry whieh would
justify the existence of knowledge itself.
~~at

led Collingwood to the drastic revision of his views

on philosophy and history was his study of A. J. Ayer's Language,
!rruth and Logle, first publ1shed 1n 1936.

He came to the conclu-

sion, with Ayer, that the propos1tions of traditional metaphysios
are unverifiable.
Such conclusions were in the back of
as he prepared his Metapbysics.

Colli~~wood1s

mind

In the first chapter of the first

part of this book, he announoes the chief intention of h1s work:
A great deal of work has been done in metaphysics since
the time when Aristotle created it; but this work has neVer
involved a radica.l reconsideration of the question what
metaphysics is. • •• On that question Aristotle bequeathed
to his successors a pronouncement conta1n1ng certa1n obscurities; and from his time to our own these obscurities
have never been cleared up. To clear them up 1s the task
of the present essay.23
What 1s the main problem With tradit10nal metaphysics?
The main problem is that 1t has as its object of invest1gat1on
-being," which means that 1t has nothing to investigate.

Colling-

Wood's problem with this object of metaphysics 1s that it is
tormed by a prooess of abstraction.

He argues that, if sc1enoe

23R. G. Collingwood, Mej;J:y?hys1os, (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1940), p. 5 •

.......
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requires a defin1te subject matter, the abstraction necessary
in forming universals can only be carried so far.

He concludes:

"The universal of pure being represents the limiting ease of the
abstractive process • • • •
case is to take out

To push abstraction to the limi.ting

everythin.~;

and when everything is taken out

there is nothin~ for science to investigate.,,24 Thus, if the
concept of being as being 1s to be formed by abstraction, there
can be no science of pure

be1~;

and metaphysics must either fold

its tent and sllent1y steal away, or it must find a new object.
However, Collingwood, not be1ng able to convince h1mself
that all past metaphys1cal speculat10n
don metaphysics.

~1aS

1n vain, did not aban-

He gave it new subject matter.

The subject

matter of metaphys1cs becomes what A. J. Ayer called "unverifiable
propositions" and what Collingwood eame to call "absolute presuppositlons."
Metaphysics is the sclence of absolute presuppositions.
The

problem raised by Ayer is skirted for, because we are dea11ng

With presuppositions, we are no longer concerned with the truth
and falsity of these presuppositions.

The absolute

t~lth

or

fals1ty of a presupposition apart from its histor1oal context, 1s
not a part of metaphys1cal 1nquiry.
;'letaphys1cs does not. 1n a. fut1le manner, seek to transcend the 11m! ts of experience.

24rPll.,

p.

14.

Primarily 1 t is an inquiry into
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't1'hat people believed, at sone partic'tl.lar historical pertod.. about
the ilTOrlcP s general nature.

Such beliefs are the presuppositions

of all their physics, that is, their lnqu11-Y into the deta11s of

the '\'1orld..

Secondrotrily t metaphysics seeks to discover the co1'-

respondinl'!: p:resupposl ti ons of other peopl(-!s and other times in

order to follo't'l the historical process by l'rhlch one set of presu.pposi t10na lw.s turnod into another 25
#

ColllrJf':l'TOod t 8 attf.H1tion i::ras drawn to absolute presuppooi tions by his insight into the quest10n-8.l1m.rel" c.Ualogue de-

scr1bed earlier in this paper.
positions are o.ns'Wers to
'Hhether
text.

S01!leth1rJ.f~

Collil1.glTood found that all proActually, to ask

questions.

partlcu~ar

113 true or false of.Lly

L~).kes

m~..an

To be true or false can only

sense in this con-

to ask

or does not anSller the

~mether

t1eular statoment

do~s

meant t;o ;3,l1m'1er.

Therefore t:ru.th or falsl ty does not

th1s or that proposition 1n isolatlon,

~~t

que:~tion

th1s par-

it 'tIas

belol'lf~

to

rather to the quest1on-

answer complex as a ~mole. 26

Any g1ven question involves a presupposition from whieh
1t directly arises.

For example, if I ask "Have you stopped

beating your wife?", such a quest10n '?lOuld never be aSked unless
I presuppose that in faet you have for some time 1n the past been
d01ng just that. 27
25ColllnP-.7wood, A~Q.1?1Qg~R.11J!"

pp.

65-66.

26Jp1d ., pp~ 38-39.
27cOl11

pp.

25- 26 •

!¥iost 1.H:'e::m.pposl tions
they are really anSl/Ters to

~U"e

prev1Ot:U~

q)l~stlon,-an.swer

the base of the

pbsolute presuppositions.

relati ve

~)resu.ppos1 tiona,

that

questlonR.

complex, there are what we call

These never come as t:tnswers to a pre-

vicus Q.uestion bu.t must be a r>resuppositlon of aJ.l relevant questiona in a. certain area of th!')l4Q;ht..

POl' example, an absolute

ore sU.:::>:no si tl011 of medicine would be: t:?:very d.lsease he.s a oause.
presuPPt)s€Kl by the d.ootor in prob1nl:{; any par-

'1'h1s 1s

~bsf)ll:ttely

t~.cula.r

disease and te8ts the relevlmoe of

"9:.t:>opose to himself in the course of h1s

l!l.ny

questions he

1nvt~st1<~~at1on..

YJla.y

It fol-

lO'N'S that because these presuPPoBi tions are not anmle:rs to ques28
tions, the problem of their truth or falsity nt,~ver ar1ses.
llhese absolute presupposi tiona are the subject ma.tter of meta-

ph,yaies.

If the funotion of memnhysics 1s the inquiry into absl)lute pre StlPl}Os1 tions,
tor1~:rJ.

aresas

t~en

the 11lt9taphysie1an ls re.f.\lly an hls-

"(tiho luo.u.ires lnto th~ absolute 9resW90os! tlons of

though-t et various times.

()f'

variolls

It ts the busl1'less of meta, ...

r>hySlos to discover through analysts what absolute premlpposltiOrl8

are

nLtlde in the

b~')ln~1;

thln1r,J.np~

of a given society n..t1d 'then,

not to jU'3tlfy them, but to desoribe them sClentlflcally.29

-

Hetaphys10s 1s an historical soience; for,
23I.Pl;d.. p.
h
29I
b" rt' ..
~

,

33.

h~
pp. 47-""I'Ve

Collln~wood
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a1"SWts, -'!'he question iIfl1at prenpposltlollS underlle the 'physlos'
01" natural 801en08 of a certain people at a certa1n tla. 18 as

pllre17 Mstortoal. a qUest10n as what kind of olothes

th.,

wear. -,0

'rhe a8tho4- or metaph,slos, then, is to be h1stonoal .e\hod aB 1t

18 OGmmonly understood at present.

Further.

~e

propositions of

lIetaph1'slos are to be historical proposltlons, "\tUItlt.ts, each tae__
physioal

P~Bl tlon

prefixed b7 what

18 to 'be tONed ot an absoluto pronpPo81 'lon

Oo111~O()d

such and suGh a phase

or

oalls the • ••taphJs1~ 'Nbno·, WIn

scienti1'l0 thought lt 18 (or . . ) ab-

B01.Ut01.,. prenppo.ed. tmat • • •• '1

The .etapb78101an, baTJ.l'tg

4180overea. and stated the absolute presuppoaltlofttl 01' a g1ven
phase

of 801entltle

thO\1.€'~t,

ftIIt then eDII1ne the

msting aong the.e pftnpposl 'lOllS.

nlatlona

'!bea. pr.suppesl tlou. 81_

the,. aN a'bsolute, must 'be 1n4.pendent 01' _oh othere tor a preftppctsl tlon that could be 4Mueed troll, some

..,0\114 , . that ve'l!'f taot

0.....

othe~

preaupposl tlon

to be an absolute presupposition.

B1.lt, though not deducible tl"Oll ene anether, 'he abfloluto p,.....

npposltlona ot a dna penod _ t 'be oOl'18u.pponlbl., a 'ea . .loll

Colll:rJg1fOod expla1u tna. -It

persO!l Who suppose. arJ1

OM

.a'

be

ot the to

logl.aU,. possln. tor a
"PPOS.

cOllCurrentl,. all

tm. rest.· 32 The .etaphyslclan, then. ma'1 exam1ne the absolute
I

J

,oaolllngwood.6rH,gblog;mphY, p. 66.
,1Colllngwood, ItitPbl".', p. SSe

,21l?2.d. t

p.

66.
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presuPPositions of a:trI' period ot soientlf10 thought, he -7 com...
pare these presuppos1 tlQllS. he may study the prooess by whlch one

set ot presupposl tiona changes into another; bUt he -1 not elaborate metaphysical s1stema,

no~

may he attach himself to a meta-

physioal school, for to do this is to tgnore the h1storical char-

acter ot metaphysl0s. JJ
The point bas

DOW

been rea.ehed

whaH

a rad1cal histor-

101_ 1s substl tuted tor met&.physlos or &.nl' other pursut t ot
ult1_te truth.

fJIetaph.TslO&l. presuppos1tions

U$

no longer true

or talse aooordlng to thelr lnt.rnal log1c but depend tor their
tnth or talsl tl upon their historical context onl1.

The problems ot phllosoph7 are then 1n no seM. "etel:"ll$l-

or ·pereDnlal".J4 For Oollingwood now explio1tly ola1as that
"blstol.7 ls the only ldnd ot lmowledge."'5 This identlfication
meaM that 'fife

OQ

ask only one question, sa.,.. aboltt Plato's

phllo8ophy and hls explanation ot
ooncept1on of goodness?"

goodnessl -ilhat

was Plato's

We a,. not ask -What 18 goodness?"

'because such a question is not oonorete and presu.pposes some ab-

solute en. tenon ot t1N.th wb101l does not ex1st.

Obvlous17 ••

mal not ask -Is Plato's ooncept of goodness true or talse1",
3~•• pp. 66-77_
)4COll1l'JgtfOOd, .•uli9la2UePl'J.l, p. 69.

)SOo111l'lgWOod. lsl"

at

B11~mf p. Xi.
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since .e can 1n no W8.7 transcend our historical cond1t1on.:36

It

we should answer the question. ttWhat did Plato think?" ,the turther question ot Whether 1t was true or not 1s answered.

What

Plato thought, 1s true in so tar as 1t answered the question Pla.to
set out to answer.
What we haTe said here about

~e

purely histor1eal char-

aetel" ot m.etaph1'81es applies also to eve:r;y other area ot thollght.
Logic 1s only an attempt to expound the prlnolplea of what, 11'1
the loglG1an' S histoncal period passed tor valid thought.

oal theortea Utfer. 1t 1s true, but we cannot declare
one true or att1 wrotag.

~

Eth1-

s1ngle

tor such theories are simply attempts to

state what ldnd ot 11te a particUlar lnd1v1dual considers worth
alm1ng tor.

Natural science 1s not absorbed 1nto hlsto1'1 as

philosophy 1s t but nel thea- o.an 1 t be considered knowled.ge.

tor
...

selenee starts trom oertain presupposl tlons and thlnks out their
consequel'lCes I but Since the pre suppos1 t101"..8 of science are ne1 ther
true nor false, thinking about th_ together With their conae-

que.noes oan be ne1ther la'JDwledge or error. 31
SiDoe phUosophleal and. hiatoacal questlons are now one
and the same. soep-vlo1a about t:ru.th m.u.st be pred1cated. ot hie-

tol'leal lCnowledge 1 tseJ.f •

Here again we oannot

36ibl<l-, p. 1x.

31XPL4.,

pp. Xi1-x111.

0011.0

up with aDl'

ori tical

sta.nd..~rds
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of right and "NTong;, true or false l-lhich tm.n-

scend a partioular historical period:
st ACI:"",:ustlne looked at Roman h1story from the point

of view of an early Chr1stian; Tillemont, from that of
a seventeenth-century Frenohman; G1bbon. from that of an

eighteenth-century Englishman; Mommsen, from that of a
nineteenth-century German. There ls no point in asklng
which was the right polnt of View. Each was the only one
possible for the man who adopted 1t.38
;,Je

should note that if we cannot ask whether a past th1nker 1s

right or wrong, we have not brought about a

rapprochemen,~

between

history and phl1osophy but have e11m1nated the philosophical
question altogether.
Having reduced all knowledge to histor1eal knowledge,
Collingwood was faced with a problem which he could not solve.
If history ls the only kind of knowledge, how does 1t justify
itself as such?

Collingwood is forced lnto the oontradlction of

attempting to justify history on non-histOrical grounds.

For
Colli~1ood the subject matter of hlstory is the concrete. 39
But the presupposltions of hlstory, of metaphysios, and of any

other fleld of inquiry in so far as they are historical sciences,
are not concrete and therefore cannot fall within the oompetence
of history; and therefore history, the only form of knowledge,
must base itself on wha.t is not knowledge..

38 Ib1d • t p. xli.
J9~b1d., p.

234.

For example,

Colli~~-
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wood's own arguments to establish the historioal character

o~

metaphysios as a scienoe of absolute presuppositions are not themselves historical and therefore are not

knowled~e-

On this pOint,

T. M. Knox oomments thus:

The I§,al oR M~~OS professes not to expound the
author's own meta a1 . rdeas. but to explain what meta.physios is and -has always been". It so t then, on his own

princ1ples, it can hardly be a work of history_ • •• 1b1losophy would thus seem to have resisted absorptIon Into
hlstor.r at the very tIme when Its absorption was being
proolalmed.. 40
CollIngwood ends his work in a. rad1eal. scepticIsm. the very enemy

he was attemptIng to esoape.
q~usion.

This thesls has attempted to concentrate on the out-

standIng oontr1bu.tions of Collingwood toward the understandIng
and apprecia.tion of the philosophy of history.

In chapters I and

II, atter a brief introduction to this field of study Itself, we
saw, in the writings of Collingwood, many impressive arguments
for the reoognition ot the values ot hIstOrical knowledge as a
balance to those who worship at the shrine ot natural so1ence.
7:Je

fu.rthersaw his attempts to resist the positiV1sts in their

attempts to absorb ph1losoph,. into :natttl"al science as the sole

torm ot knowledge.

Untol"tuMtely, as we have seen tn Chapter III,

Collingwood ultimately went further than the impressive arguments
oftered in the 14M:

ot Bi§rtpa:.

.Paradoxically, he tool! up a

post tion, equally intransigent and just as scept1cal, as was that

}:dea ot

4oT. M.. Knox. "Editor's Pretaee," in Collingwood, ~

R\stoU. p. xix.
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of his posi t1vi st oppo nents .

He bega n to cla.lm for histo ry exactly "mat they claim ed for scien ce. The goal of his life
's work ,
the r3.Imrocll81"'1cnt of philo soph y and h1sto l"Y did not
t
in the end,

cont ent him.
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